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Abstract
This thesis describes a project that utilizes honeypots to detect worms. A
detailed description of existing worm detection techniques using honeypots
is given, as well as a study of existing worm propagation models. Simulations
using some of these worm propagation models are also conducted. Although
the results of the simulations coincide with the collected data from the actual
outbreak of a network worm, they also conclude that it is difficult to produce
realistic results prior to a worm outbreak.
A worm detection mechanism called HoneyComb is incorporated in the hon-
eypot setup installed at NTNU, and experiments are conducted to evaluate
its effectiveness and reliability. The mechanism generated a large amount of
false positives in these experiments, possibly due to an error discovered in
the implementation of the detection algorithm.
An architecture using honeypots for detection of unknown worms is pro-
posed. This architecture is based on a combination of two recently published
systems with the extension referred to as a Known-Attack (KA) filter. By
using this filter, it is believed that the amount of traffic needed to be pro-
cessed by the honeypot sensors will be considerably reduced.
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Terminology
Some terms are used in this thesis without being explicitly explained in the
text. This section describes what is meant by the terms listed below when
they are used in this thesis.
Asset
A component that has value to the owner [1].
Blackhat
A person who tries to execute illegal attacks against computer systems.
A blackhat could either be politically or economically motivated, or the
motivation could be pure curiosity.
Risk
The chance that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or
group of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization [1].
Threat
Something that has the potential to cause an unwanted event that may result
in harm to a system or organization and its assets [1].
Vulnerability
A weakness of an asset or group of assets which can be exploited by a
threat [1].
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, several worm outbreaks on the Internet have caused major
computer troubles worldwide. The Code Red worm infected almost 360.000
computers in less than 14 hours in 2001. The economic impact of Code
Red, and its subsequent versions, has been estimated to over 2.6 billion US
dollars [2]. The Slammer worm, released in 2003, propagated extremely
rapidly and generated so much traffic that many ATM machines failed and
several airline flights were cancelled due to online booking problems [3].
It is likely that new worms, able to propagate even faster than Slammer
and causing larger economical damage than Code Red, will appear on the
Internet in the near future. When they do, there is a need for an automated
mechanism to efficiently detect and stop them, as no human-mediated re-
action will have a chance of detecting and responding to the threat quickly
enough to prevent a global outbreak.
Honeypots, decoy computers and services that are assigned otherwise unused
IP addresses, have proven to be useful tools against blackhats and worms.
Deploying honeypots in a distributed early detection and warning system is
a promising approach in the process of developing a fully automated worm
protection system.
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1.1 Background
In the last couple of years, several students at NTNU have worked on the
subject of honeypots. Mona Elisabeth Østvang studied the use of honeynets
as an information source in a business perspective in her master’s thesis [4],
while Christian Larsen used honeypots to document threats from the black-
hat community in his master’s thesis [5]. Dag Christoffersen and Bengt
Jonny Mauland studied malicious traffic on the Internet using honeypots [6]
in their minor thesis. These projects have all motivated further study on
the use of honeypots.
The honeypot setup was initially installed at NTNU by Larsen, and has
been further developed during the work on this thesis to incorporate a worm
detection mechanism.
1.2 Problem Statement
The main goals of this project were identified as to:
• Document existing work on the topic of worm detection, with an em-
phasis on methods involving the use of honeypots.
• Study existing worm propagation models and conduct simulations us-
ing some of these models to evaluate their accuracy compared to data
collected from a real worm outbreak.
• Incorporate a worm detection system in the honeypot setup installed
at NTNU and conduct experiments with this system to evaluate its
effectiveness and reliability when it comes to detecting worms.
• Propose an architecture for detection of unknown worms utilizing hon-
eypots based on the experiments conducted in this project and the
existing work done on worm detection.
Initially, the objective was to implement several worm detection mechanisms
utilizing honeypots in the NTNU honeypot setup, in order to perform a
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comparative analysis. However, this turned out to be difficult as many of
the existing worm detection tools were unavailable for testing.
1.3 Research Method
A theoretical survey on the subjects of worms and detection of worms is
conducted. This survey also includes a comparative analysis of some existing
worm propagation models based on simulations. While doing this research,
the experiment tools are installed and tested in order to get familiar with
them before conducting the experimental study.
A worm detection system architecture is proposed based on the experiences
from the experimental study as well as the knowledge gained while conduct-
ing the theoretical survey.
1.4 Structure of the Report
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 – Introduction to Honeypots
This chapter gives a brief introduction to the concepts of honeypots. Some
of the values of using honeypots are outlined, as well as risks involved when
deploying them on the Internet.
Chapter 3 – Introduction to Worms
This chapter describes some typical worm characteristics and various worm
propagation models as well as simulation of some of these. In addition, a
selection of worms that have appeared on the Internet the recent years and
some possible properties of future worms are presented.
Chapter 4 – Worm Countermeasures
This chapter presents two categories of worm countermeasures; worm detec-
tion and worm protection.
Chapter 5 – Worm Detection Experiments
3
Introduction
This chapter describes worm detection experiments conducted using the
honeypot detection tool HoneyComb.
Chapter 6 – An Architecture for Detection of Unknown Worms
A worm detection architecture is proposed in this chapter.
Chapter 7 – Conclusions
This chapter summarizes and concludes the report.
Chapter 8 – Further Work
In this chapter, some suggestions for further work are given.
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Chapter 2
Introduction to Honeypots
The concept of honeypots was first documented by Clifford Stoll [7] and
William R. Cheswick [8] in the early 1990’s. However, honeypots have not
become widely used until the last couple of years. The founder of The
Honeynet Project [Honb], Lance Spitzner, suggests that this may be due
to a lack of understanding of what a honeypot is, and what it is capable
of doing [9]. By defining a honeypot as an information system resource
whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource [9], he has
helped clarify the value of honeypots – they are used to attract persons and
programs with malicious intent.
As the popularity of honeypots has increased, they have been subject to
extensive research which has lead to several implementations. One example
of a honeypot solution available on the Internet is the honeynet architec-
ture [Honb] developed by The Honeynet Project.
2.1 Purpose of Deployment
When considering the purpose of deployment, honeypots are often divided
into two categories, namely research and production honeypots.
Research honeypots are, as the name suggests, primarily used for research
purposes. They can be used to capture information about the attackers’
5
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goals and activities, to detect new kinds of attacks or even capture the tools
used by the attacker. In this way, research honeypots can provide useful
and up-to-date information about the blackhat community. By analyzing
the attack tools used by the blackhats and creating new IDS signatures,
research honeypots may also help to improve the defense against future
attacks.
Production honeypots are deployed in production systems with the inten-
tion of diverting attacks away from critical systems, hopefully keeping the
attacker busy for a period of time while the real assets are protected [9].
These kinds of honeypots are not primarily used for gathering information
about attacks, but could potentially be used to gather evidence against ma-
licious hackers. The legal aspect of this approach is, however, not clear, as
the blackhat could argue entrapment. For a discussion concerning the legal
aspects of running honeypots, [9] is a good starting point.
2.2 Level of Interaction
Another way to categorize honeypots is by the level of interaction they
offer to their attacker [9]. The lower the interaction level, the smaller the
chance of learning anything new from the attacker. On the other hand,
as the interaction level increases, the risk of the honeypot being identified
and completely compromised by a sophisticated attacker increases. If the
honeypot supervisor is outsmarted by an attacker, the honeypot may in fact
become a liability, as it could be used as a launching pad for new attacks [9].
A low-interaction honeypot will typically run or emulate a small number
of services on a real or emulated operating system. The services are often
script driven, offering only basic functionality. This can give the impression
to an attacker that a real service is run. One example of a low-interaction
honeypot is Honeyd [10], developed by Niels Provos.
A high-interaction honeypot is often a real computer running a real operating
system and offering the same interaction capabilities as any other computer
connected to the Internet. Due to the high interaction level provided, and
6
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the fact that this type of honeypot is much more difficult to fingerprint1,
the chance of a sophisticated attacker launching an attack is much higher.
2.3 Value of Honeypots
The value of a honeypot is, to a large extent, dependent on its purpose of
deployment. Since research honeypots are used for research purposes, their
value lies in the results from the analysis of the captured data. The most
important value of a production honeypot, on the other hand, is the ability
to divert attackers away from real production systems.
A general property of a honeypot, independent of its purpose of deployment,
is the fact that it does not contain any real information. It is not running
any real services and its address is not broadcasted in any way. Due to this,
no legitimate users should interact with it, and thus, all traffic to and from
the honeypot can be considered suspect [11]. This helps to keep the logs
more comprehensible compared to other network devices that also receive
large amounts of legitimate traffic.
In addition to making the logs more comprehensible, this property will also
help keep the resource consumption at a lower level than with other network
logging devices. These devices are more likely to experience exhaustion if
the networks they are monitoring have high bandwidth, since the volumes
of data they have to inspect can become too large [9].
Using honeypots as a mean of detecting and containing worms have led
to the idea of striking back against worms and patch the infected hosts
automatically. A proof of concept has been made by Laurent Oudot who
successfully created a script for Honeyd that would strike back against the
Blaster worm if it attempted to infect a Honeyd honeypot [12]. The script
used the same exploit as the worm itself to gain access to the remote com-
puter, deleted the msblast.exe file and cleaned the registry of any worm
records. Although this technique is efficient and promising, there are legal
1The term fingerprinting is often used in the case where an attacker is able to reveal
the true identity of a honeypot.
7
Introduction to Honeypots
issues regarding remote patching that need to be addressed before deploying
such a scheme outside the local network.
The use of honeypots as a mean of slowing down the propagation of Internet
worms has also been suggested. The ”sticky” honeypot, or tarpit, called
LaBrea [LaB] is a low-interaction honeypot that answers TCP requests in a
manner that may slow down worms that have to wait for a response before
they continue scanning for other vulnerable hosts.
Although honeypots have desirable properties and have proved to be efficient
when detecting computer attacks, it is important to notice that they are not
meant to replace existing security technologies. On the contrary, honeypots
should be used in conjunction with other detection systems to enhance the
security. One reason for this is the limited view field of the honeypot. The
only traffic examined by the honeypot is the traffic directed towards itself,
thus it is not able to monitor the traffic bound to other resources in the
network, as a network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is able to. Another
reason is that deployment of a honeypot may induce risks to other, non-
honeypot systems in the network, as is further elaborated in 2.5.
2.4 Honeynets
The first generation honeynet architecture was developed by the Honeynet
Project [Honb] in 1999. Since then, several improvements have been made,
and the latest generation (GenIII) was released in 2005.
A honeynet system typically consists of one or several high-interaction hon-
eypots running a set of full-blown applications and services. Each of these
honeypots are connected to the Internet through a Honeywall, which is a
layer 2 gateway2 in charge of data control and data capture. The Honeywall
can operate as a network intrusion prevention system (NIPS) blocking all
known outgoing attacks as well as limiting the number of outgoing connec-
2The gateway must be located on the Data Link Layer to avoid incrementing the Time-
To-Live (TTL) field in the IP header. This is done to minimize the chance of the Honeywall
being detected by an attacker.
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tions to help reduce the risk of the honeypots being used to attack other
systems.
According to Lance Spitzner, one of the future goals of the Honeynet Project
is to develop a centralized data collection system that can correlate infor-
mation from several distributed honeynets. The system should also be able
to correlate and analyze the incoming data in real-time, providing early
warning and protection systems with reports of zero-day attacks [13].
2.5 Risks Associated With Honeypots
Even though honeypots can help to increase the network security, there are
several risks involved with deploying a honeypot system.
First, a honeypot host may be compromised by an advanced blackhat. If
such a compromised host is used as a launching pad for new attacks against
third-party computers, the honeypot owners may themselves be held respon-
sible. To minimize this risk, a NIPS that blocks malicious outgoing traffic
can be deployed in front of the honeypots.
Second, the honeypots may be fingerprinted. That is, based on certain
characteristics or behaviors of a honeypot, a blackhat may be able to reveal
its true identity. This could scare off potential attackers, but it may just
as well attract attention to the network by sparking the blackhats’ sense of
vindictiveness [9].
There is also a chance that research-honeypots are fed with poisoned data,
leading to compromised experiments and false conclusions regarding the
blackhats’ behavior [9]. The risk of this happening increases if the honeypots
have been fingerprinted.
Tools to help blackhats fingerprint honeypots automatically have emerged in
recent years in line with the increasing popularity of honeypots. In addition,
a fake paper [pap] published by Phrack lists possible ways to identify a
honeypot. This is a clear indication that the blackhat community is aware
of the increased usage of honeypots, and that existing honeypot solutions
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are in a constant need of further development in order to make fingerprinting
increasingly difficult.
2.5.1 Risks Associated With the Honeypots in this Thesis
Since the honeypots used in the experiments described in this thesis have
been located on the same subnetworks for over a year, there is a certain
risk that they have been identified by the blackhat community. This risk is,
however, considered to be very low because the majority of attacks directed
towards the honeypots deployed in the subnetworks used in this thesis are
believed to be executed by script-kiddies3. This assumption is based on the
analysis in [6], which reported frequent use of automated attack tools. It
is also believed that advanced blackhats are unlikely to devote their time
trying to attack the honeypots used in this thesis, as they do not contain,
or give the impression of containing, any useful information.
The latter argument is also one of the reasons why the risk of any of the
honeypots being used as a launching pad for new attacks is considered to
be very low. In addition, all the honeypots used in the experiments are low-
interaction, only running a set of emulated services on a minimal operating
system, and they are all patched with the latest security updates.
Even though the results from the experiments conducted in [6] give no in-
dication that the honeypots have been fingerprinted or used to attack other
systems, several precautions are taken to minimize the risks during the ex-
periments in this thesis. A firewall configured with a default drop policy
is used to protect the machine hosting the low-interaction honeypots. The
alerts, system logs and password files are inspected daily to check for irreg-
ularities. In case of any such irregularities, the honeypot system should be
locked down, the project supervisor and the network administrators should
be informed and the system design should be carefully re-evaluated before
redeployment. The guidelines for use of the honeypot setup can be found in
Appendix A.
3An unskilled blackhat utilizing automated attack tools is often referred to as a script-
kiddie.
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Introduction to Worms
The term worm in a computer network context was first adopted in John
Brunner’s 1975 science fiction novel Shockwave Rider [14], in which a worm
was used as a weapon to fight and finally shut down a malicious computer
network. The first study of computer worms was conducted by the Xe-
rox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) in the late 1970’s. As in the mid-
seventies science fiction novel, Xerox PARC also viewed worms as a helpful
tool, the intention being to utilize unused computer resources connected
through a network. The experiments at Xerox PARC did, however, give the
first indications of what has now become an increasingly common part of
computer networks, namely malicious worms, as one of the worms acciden-
tally crashed the hosts on the test network [15].
The first known computer worm to be released on the Internet was the Morris
worm [16], which caused panic among network administrators in late 1988.
Following the Morris worm and a series of other malicious worms over the last
years, the term computer worm has come to be associated with a malicious
piece of software, much like a computer virus. In fact, the two terms are
often interchangeably used. In this master’s thesis, however, worms and
viruses will be distinguished. Weaver et al. [17] defines a computer worm
as a program that self-propagates across a network exploiting security or
policy flaws in widely-used services. A worm able to exploit several different
vulnerabilities is called a multi-vectored worm. Viruses divert from this
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definition by the fact that they are depending on some sort of user action
in order to propagate, making the propagation slower than most worms. In
addition, viruses attaches themselves to a host program on the victim host
while worms are independent [18].
An infected host running the worm executables is called a worm node. The
collection of the hosts infected by a specific worm is referred to as the worm
network [15].
3.1 Worm Characteristics
Worms can be categorized by their target discovery technique, propagation
carrier and distribution mechanism, activation and payload [17].
3.1.1 Target Discovery
Target discovery is the first step of the worm propagation, the purpose
being to detect new hosts to infect. There are several possible techniques by
which a vulnerable target can be discovered: by scanning, by use of various
target lists and by passive monitoring [17]. Many of the most effective
worms combine several of these techniques in order to use the best from
each technique.
Scanning
The scanning technique involves probing a set of addresses in order to detect
vulnerable hosts. The simplest forms of scanning are sequential and random
scanning. The former implies probing addresses sequentially from an address
block, while the latter implies trying addresses from an address block in a
pseudo-random fashion. Their simplicity makes them frequently used.
To increase the efficiency of the target discovery mechanism, worm authors
have suggested several optimizations for scanning worms. One optimization
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is the preference for local addresses in order to reduce latency. This is com-
monly referred to as island hopping because the worm’s spreading pattern
tends to resemble islands. In addition to reducing latency, island hopping
will also reduce the number of encounters, and thereby possible detections
and failed infection attempts, with firewalls and NATs. At the same time,
it makes the worm more vulnerable in its initial stage, as total containment
is possible if the worm is detected and isolated while still infecting hosts in
the initial local network [15]. Another optimization is a bandwidth-limited
scanner which implies that the scanning process is limited by the bandwidth
of the compromised host, not by the latency of connection requests, as is
often the case [17].
The use of scanning causes highly anomalous behavior as it generates a lot
of traffic that differs from normal traffic. This makes the worms easier to
detect.
Target Lists
Target discovery can also be carried out through the use of target lists.
Worms utilizing such lists are often referred to as hitlist worms and are
characterized by their extremely rapid spreading speed.
One example is the use of pre-generated target lists where a set of hosts
known or suspected to be vulnerable to attack is gathered in advance and is
included in the actual worm payload. A small target list of this kind could
be used to accelerate the spreading of a scanning worm, while a complete
list could create a flash worm which is further elaborated in section 3.4.3.
An externally generated target list is a target list not included in the worm’s
payload, but maintained by a separate server. The list can be downloaded
to infected machines in order to select new victims. An externally generated
target list located at a central server makes it easy to issue updated target
lists, but at the same time, if the central server is compromised the worm
may be prevented from further propagation [15].
Yet another example of a target list is the host-based lists in which the
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worm utilizes information stored on the infected host to decide which hosts
to attack next. Worms utilizing host-based lists for target discovery are
called topological worms.
Passive Monitoring
Worms using a passive monitoring technique are not actively searching for
new victims. Instead, they are waiting for new targets to contact them or
rely on the user to discover new targets. Although passive worms tend to
have a slow propagation rate, they are often difficult to detect because they
generate modest anomalous reconnaissance traffic.
3.1.2 Propagation Carrier and Distribution Mechanism
There are three possible methods by which a worm can propagate from an
infected host to an uninfected one [17].
Self-Carried
A self-carried worm transmits itself as part of the infection process. This
mechanism is commonly used when the initial attack is directly followed
by the worm payload transmission, as is the case with self-activating and
topological worms.
Second Channel
Some worms require a second communication channel in order to complete
the infection process. One example is to have the victim host request the
transfer of the actual worm code to complete the infection.
Embedded
An embedded worm transmits itself as part of a normal communication
channel by appending itself to, or replacing, an existing payload. This yields
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modest anomalous traffic related to propagation and could be combined with
a stealthy target discovery mechanism, like the passive monitoring mecha-
nism described in the previous section, in order to create a stealthy worm.
3.1.3 Activation
The means by which a worm is activated on a newly infected host drastically
affects its propagation speed.
Human Activity-Based Activation
Some worms are activated when the user performs some activity, like reset-
ting the machine, logging onto the system and thereby running the login
scripts or executing a remotely infected file. Evidently, such worms do not
spread very rapidly.
Scheduled Process Activation
A faster spreading speed than the previous activation method is achieved
by worms that rely on some scheduled process for activation. An example
is automatic software updates, which can be used to install and run mali-
cious software (e.g., a worm). Earlier versions of automatic update services
were more susceptible to this kind of attack as they rarely employed any
authentication.
Self Activation
The fastest spreading worms are the ones that are able to activate them-
selves by initiating their own execution as soon as the infection process is
completed. This is done by exploiting vulnerabilities in a service that is
always running and available, or in the libraries that these services use. The
worms activate themselves by attaching themselves to the running service or
by executing commands using the permissions associated with those services.
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3.1.4 Payload
The worm code not related to propagation is called the worm payload. It
can vary significantly depending on the goals of the worm’s author. Some
examples are presented in this section.
None/Nonfunctional
The most common payload is actually no or a nonfunctional payload. Even
with no payload, the worm can still consume considerable network and com-
puter resources, as well as advertising vulnerable hosts.
Remote Control
Some payloads can open backdoors on victim machines in order to make
remote control of the captured machines possible by bypassing the usual
security access procedures. By introducing a trojan horse to the infected
machine, it is possible to gain access to files that normally require certain
user privileges [18].
Denial of Service (DoS)
A commonly used payload is to issue a Denial of Service attack against one
or several web sites. The effect of a DoS attack increases with the number
of nodes participating in the attack. A large worm network can cause large
damage by issuing a Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack, where all the worm
nodes simultaneously launch attacks against the same web site.
Data Collection
An increasing amount of sensitive information is stored electronically these
days. Worm payload can search for this type of information (e.g., credit card
numbers). Findings could be encrypted and transmitted through various
channels.
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Data Damage
Data damage is likely to become a popular worm payload, like it has been
for some time for computer viruses. It can be used to erase or manipulate
data on the infected host, or even to encrypt data in order to extort the
owner of the information.
3.2 Worm Propagation Models
In order to defend against network worms it is essential to understand their
propagation patterns. As stated earlier in this chapter, many existing worms
can be identified by their distinctive behavior (e.g., rapid propagation).
Long before the introduction of network worms, the medical science have uti-
lized mathematical models to understand and predict the spread of diseases.
The resemblance between network worms and biological diseases has led to
extensive use of similar models when studying worm propagation patterns.
Understanding these patterns can help defend against network worms.
This section describes existing worm propagation models, covering both tra-
ditional epidemic models, as well as models customized to fit the behavior
of contemporary network worms. The results from simulations of the Code
Red I v2 worm using some of these models are also presented along with
some limitations using worm propagation models.
Unless otherwise stated, it is assumed that the worms are spreading from
host to host, are active on all the infected hosts and that infected hosts
actively search for new hosts to infect. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
total population is constant, and that each host in the population can reach
any other host in one hop. Finally, it is assumed that all hosts susceptible
to infection are equally susceptible [15, 19].
Even though worm propagation is a discrete event process, meaning that a
host needs to be completely infected before it can start infecting other hosts,
the models thoroughly described in this chapter are continuous. However,
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when dealing with large-scale systems, as is the case with global worm prop-
agations, this is an accurate approximation [19].
3.2.1 Susceptible-Infectious (SI) Model
In the SI model, also referred to as the classical simple epidemic model, each
host is either susceptible to infection or already infected. The only valid
transition between states in the SI model is from susceptible to infectious,
as illustrated in Figure 3.1 (a). This means that an infected host is assumed
to remain infected forever. The model defines a set of parameters, as shown
in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Valid state transitions in worm propagation models.
S(t) The number of susceptible hosts at time t
I(t) The number of infected hosts at time t
N The size of the vulnerable population
β Average infection rate1
Table 3.1: Parameters of the SI model.
The model is described by the two differential equations given in (3.1):
dI(t)
dt = βI(t)S(t)
dS(t)
dt = −βI(t)S(t)
(3.1)
Since all hosts in the SI model are either infectious or susceptible, it is easy
to see that the growth of susceptible hosts is inversely proportional to the
infection growth.
1The average infection rate, β, can be expressed as a function of the worm’s average
probe rate, r. A scanning worm probing the entire IPv4 address field at random yields
β = r N
232
[20].
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The model assumes the initial number of susceptible hosts to be far greater
than the starting number of infectious hosts. As a result, the initial infection
growth is exponential. As the number of susceptible and infectious hosts
evens out, the growth decreases, but the infection does not stop until all hosts
in the vulnerable population are infected. This follows from the somewhat
unrealistic assumption that the only valid transition in the SI model is from
susceptible to infectious. The next section presents a more realistic model
that includes the fact that, in most diseases, an infected individual can either
recover or die [19].
3.2.2 Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) Model
The SIR model, also referred to as the classical general epidemic model or
the Kermack-McKendrick model after its inventors, adds a removed state
to the susceptible and infectious states in the SI model. The removed state
represents the individuals that have recovered and are immune, the ones that
have been quarantined and are thus out of circulation, and the individuals
that have died from the infection. Hence, there are two valid transitions
in this model: the transition from susceptible to infectious, analogous to
the SI model, and the transition from infectious to removed, as indicated
in Figure 3.1 (b). In addition to the parameters introduced in the previous
section, the SIR model utilizes the parameters shown in Table 3.2 [19].
R(t) The number of removed hosts at time t
γ Average removal rate
Table 3.2: Additional parameters of the SIR model.
The model describes the worm propagation by the following set of differential
equations: 
dI(t)
dt = βI(t)S(t)− γI(t)
dS(t)
dt = −βI(t)S(t)
dR(t)
dt = γI(t)
(3.2)
By introducing the relative removal rate, ρ = γβ , the first equation in (3.2)
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can be rewritten as follows:
dI(t)
dt
= β[S(t)− ρ]I(t) (3.3)
Because the population is assumed to be finite and each host can be infected
only once, the epidemic will eventually die out. When it does, all hosts in
the population will either still be susceptible to infection or removed.
By examining (3.3), one can observe an interesting property of the SIR
model. Clearly, I(t) ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0. As a result, the sign of the term on the
left side of the equality in (3.3) is the same as the sign of the term inside
the square brackets. Hence,
dI(t)
dt > 0 if and only if S(t) > ρ.
Because S(t) is a monotonically decreasing function (no new susceptibles
are added to the population at any point in time), if S(0) ≤ ρ then S(t) ≤ ρ
for all t > 0, and hence dI(t)dt ≤ 0 for all positive values of t. This means
that there will not be an epidemic unless the initial number of susceptibles
is greater than some critical value ρ [19].
3.2.3 Two-Factor Worm Model
Although the SIR model presented in the previous section is accurate when
it comes to modeling biological infectious diseases, it has been deemed in-
sufficient when modeling network worms due to two factors2 which affect
worm propagation in the Internet in particular [21]:
• Human countermeasures, such as patching or upgrading susceptible
hosts, cleaning infected hosts, blocking worm traffic in virus detec-
tion systems, firewalls and edge routers or disconnecting hosts from
the network altogether, are taken as the worm propagates and more
and more people become aware of its presence. This may result in a
2The two factors are based on events observed during the propagation of the Code Red
I v2 worm, which will be further elaborated in the next section. However, because many
scanning worms resemble the Code Red I v2 when it comes to propagation pattern, the
two-factor worm model can be used for other worms as well [21].
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quarantine of susceptible hosts in addition to the removal of infectious
hosts, as indicated in the state machine in Figure 3.1 (c).
• The infection rate, β, is not constant during a large-scale worm propa-
gation on the Internet, as assumed in the epidemic models. One reason
for this is that the large amount of generated worm traffic can result in
congested networks and global BGP3 routing instabilities and hence,
decreased infection rate [23].
To represent the susceptible hosts that are patched or updated, the two-
factor worm model introduces a set of quarantined hosts. The parameters
used by the two-factor worm model not already presented in the two epi-
demic models are shown in Table 3.3 (the time-dependent β-value in this
model replaces the constant β in the epidemic models, as argued above).
Q(t) The number of quarantined hosts at time t
β(t) Average infection rate at time t
Table 3.3: Additional parameters of the two-factor worm model.
The model is described by the following set of differential equations:
dI(t)
dt = β(t)S(t)I(t)− dR(t)dt
dS(t)
dt = −β(t)S(t)I(t)− dQ(t)dt
dR(t)
dt = γI(t)
dQ(t)
dt = µS(t)[I(t) +R(t)]
(3.4)
By combining the first and the third equation above, the infection growth
can be rewritten as shown in (3.5).
dI(t)
dt
= [β(t)S(t)− γ]I(t) (3.5)
From calculus it is known that the extreme values of a function, i.e., the
minimum and/or maximum values, can be found by setting the derivative
3The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an Internet protocol used by edge routers of
a domain to share routing information with edge routers of other domains [22].
21
Introduction to Worms
equal to zero. It follows that the derivative of I(t) is zero when the term
inside the square brackets in (3.5) is zero. Because both the infection rate
and the number of susceptibles are decreasing functions of time, β(t)S(t)−
γ < 0 for t > tc (i.e., the point is a maximum point), thus the maximum
number of infectious hosts occur at time tc when S(tc) = γβ(tc) [21].
3.2.4 Other Models
A number of worm propagation models, other than the ones already pre-
sented, have been proposed over the past couple of years. This section gives
a brief description of some of these.
Improved Worm Mitigation Model (IWMM)
Onwubiko et al. [24] presents an extension of the SIR model, the Improved
Worm Mitigation Model, for modeling the spread of aggressive network
worms. The model considers five states (susceptibles, removed, infected,
quarantined, recovered) and argues that three states, as used by the SIR
model and the two-factor model, cannot accurately include all the counter-
measures available for the spread of a network worm. As stated in 3.2.3,
the two-factor model actually considers four states, not three. Furthermore,
the five states presented in the IWMM can be reduced to the four states
considered in the two-factor model without any significant impact on the
modeling of the worm propagation. The reason is that the two-factor model
views the quarantined state and recovered state in the IWMM as one com-
bined state, namely the removed state4. As there is no transition from the
quarantined state back to the infected state in the IWMM, the separation
of the previously infected hosts into two distinct states has no effect as they
are permanently out of circulation in either state. In addition, the set of dif-
ferential equations that is used to describe the IWMM does not correspond
to the presented state machine. As a result, the IWMM is an improvement
4In the IWMM, the names of the states used to denote the hosts removed from the
set of susceptible hosts and the hosts that are removed from the set of infected hosts are
interchanged with respect to the two-factor model.
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to the SIR model, but it is essentially the same as the existing two-factor
model.
Scanned Model
The scanned model was proposed as part of a study which examined the
effect of the infection time on worm propagation. The SIR model, presented
in 3.2.2, was extended to include a scanned state. This state represents the
hosts that have been targeted by an infected host, but have not yet down-
loaded the worm payload and hence, have not started infecting other hosts.
The study concluded that, due to the continually increasing bandwidth and
trend for smaller worm payloads, the infection time did not seem to have
any significant effect on the worm propagation [25].
Analytical Active Worm Model (AAWM)
Chen et al. [26] present a discrete time worm propagation model for the
spread of random scanning worms. It is argued that a discrete time model
can predict the propagation more accurately than a continuous time model.
This, however, is at the expense of more complicated mathematics. Com-
parison of the simulations of the Code Red I v2 and observed data from
Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [CAI] of the
actual worm propagation yields good results. The model is also extended to
the Local AAWP which can be used to model, and thereby further under-
stand, worms utilizing an island hopping technique.
3.2.5 Code Red I v2 Simulations
This section presents results from simulating the Code Red I v2 worm using
the three models described in 3.2.1 to 3.2.3 in Matlab [Mat] and compares
the results with the observed data from CAIDA.
As in [21], the decreasing infection rate used in the two-factor model is
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modeled by the following equation:
β(t) = β0[1− I(t)
N
]η (3.6)
where β0 is the initial infection rate and η is used to adjust the infection
rate sensitivity to the number of infectious host.
In order to provide numerical solutions of the propagation models, the pa-
rameters and initial values of the differential equations need to be selected.
The parameters N = 500, 000, I(0) = 1, S(0) = N − I(0), R(0) = Q(0) =
0, β = β0 = 2232 , γ = 0, 00002, as used in [25] and [26] to simulate the Code
Red I v2 worm, are used in the simulations in this report. In addition,
η = 3, µ = 5e11 are used for the two-factor model.
Matlab was used to solve the sets of differential equations representing the
three propagation models, as well as to plot the results. The script used to
simulate Code Red I v2 with the SIR model in [25] was extended to include
the SI model as well as the two-factor model. The Matlab scripts used for
the simulations in this thesis can be found in Appendix B. The results of
the simulations are depicted in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.3 shows the number of hosts infected by the Code Red I v2 as
collected by CAIDA using a /8 network at the University of California, San
Diego, and two /16 networks at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory on the day
of the outbreak (19th of July 2001) [2]. In the collected data, a host was
assumed to be infected if it sent TCP SYN packets on port 80 to unused
IP addresses. Based on simulations and analyses, [26] concludes that 224
monitored addresses is sufficient to collect realistic data on a worm outbreak.
Hence, the /8 network should provide accurate data for the propagation of
the Code Red I v2.
As can be seen from the two figures, the simulations show the same trends
as the collected data, especially the simulations using the SIR and the two-
factor model. When studying the two figures in detail, it appears that the
SIR model is the one of the three models that matches the collected data best
when it comes to predicting the maximum number of infected hosts. This
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Figure 3.2: Simulations of the Code Red I v2 propagation.
may appear strange since the two-factor model is presented as an extension
of the SIR model to better model network worms. The reason for this may
be that the parameters used to model the Code Red I v2 are primarily used
to model the epidemical models in [25] and [26] and may therefore have been
chosen to optimize the results of the SIR model compared to the observed
data. It is possible that other parameters would have favored the two-factor
model. The tuning of the parameters used in the worm propagation models
is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis.
3.2.6 Limitations Using Worm Propagation Models
Even though worm propagation models can be a useful tool, it is important
to realize that they have their limitations. One limitation is that the models
cannot be used to predict periods where the worm is not actively spreading.
Another limitation is that in order to match the numerical solutions from
the models with observed propagation patterns, it is necessary to determine
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Figure 3.3: Code Red I v2 outbreak as recorded by CAIDA [CAI01].
a number of parameters, as stated in the previous section. As of yet, it
is not possible to accurately determine these parameters prior to a worm
outbreak.
3.3 Worm History
”I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the
lamp of experience. I know no way of judging of the future but
by the past.”
Edward Gibbon,
18th century English historian.
Although it is not sufficient to look at the past alone in order to detect new
worms, it is not unlikely that worm authors will study existing worms and
incorporate parts that have proven successful in the past when constructing
new worms. This section describes some of the worms that have appeared
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on the Internet in recent years. A summary of these worms is given in
Table 3.4.
Worm Propagation Protocol Payload Exploit Released
Morris Known hosts TCP None Buffer overflow Nov. 1988
E-mail Trust policy
Backdoor
Code Random TCP DDoS Buffer overflow July 2001
Red I scanning
Code Island-hopping TCP Creates Buffer overflow Aug. 2001
Red II backdoor
Nimda Island-hopping TCP Infects Directory- Sept. 2001
E-mail binaries to traversal
Backdoor create Trojans HTML rendering
SQL Random UDP None Buffer overflow Jan. 2003
Slammer scanning
W32/ Sequential TCP DDoS Buffer overflow Aug. 2003
Blaster scanning
Table 3.4: Worm history summary.
3.3.1 Morris Worm
The Morris Worm [16], named after its author Robert Tappan Morris,
emerged on the Internet in November 1988. It benefited from the fact that
the hosts that constituted the Internet in 1988 were largely homogenous and
tightly connected with respect to trust relationships. The limited number
of hosts (approximately 60.000) that formed the Internet at the time made
scanning for new victims by probing random IP addresses ineffective. In-
stead, the worm searched for new hosts to infect on the already infected
hosts. It exploited multiple vulnerabilities in order to propagate. In that
sense, it was not only the first worm to be observed on the Internet, but also
the first multi-vectored worm.
Upon infection, the source code of the worm was transferred to and com-
piled on the newly infected host. This made it possible to attack different
architectures. The worm’s sole purpose was to further propagate itself to
new hosts, and even though it had no malicious payload, the propagation
process consumed vast processing resources.
The outbreak of the Morris Worm resulted in the formation of the Com-
puter Emergency Response Team (CERT), the purpose being to study and
distribute information about security vulnerabilities and incidents [CER].
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3.3.2 Code Red I
The Code Red I worm [27] first appeared in mid-July 2001. It exploits a
vulnerability in Microsoft IIS Web servers. Although CERT had described
the vulnerability a month earlier [28], few sites had installed the issued patch
at the time when the worm was first released [15].
The worm starts by attempting to connect to TCP port 80 on a randomly
chosen host. If the target host has IIS enabled, a TCP connection is estab-
lished, and the attacking host sends a HTTP GET request that attempts to
exploit a buffer overflow5 in the Indexing Service on the victim host [27].
Following a successful infection, the worm will start running on the new
host. The earliest variant of the worm changes the default reply to all page
requests received by the infected server to be
"HELLO! Welcome to http://www.worm.com! Hacked by Chinese!"
if the default language is English. Later variants of the worm left the server
content unaltered, as was also the case if the default language was not En-
glish [27].
The worm activity on an infected host is depending on the day of the month.
During the first 19 days of the month, the worm attempts to further prop-
agate by scanning random IP addresses. The next eight days are used to
launch a distributed DoS attack against http://www.whitehouse.gov. The
worm is idle during the remaining days of the month.
The Code Red I worm had two major flaws. A file check was performed to
check if a host was already infected with the worm. By manually creating
this file it was possible to prevent the worm from installing all of its compo-
nents upon infection. Originally, the worm used the same random number
generator seed every time in order to produce a list of IP addresses to scan.
This meant that some networks experienced massive amounts of scanning
while others were not affected. It also made it possible to predict the worm
propagation. A new version of the worm, the Code Red I v2, was quickly
5For more information on buffer overflow, [29] is a good starting point.
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released to fix the problem with the random number generator [15].
3.3.3 Code Red II
The Code Red II was released a couple of weeks after the Code Red I worm.
It exploits the same vulnerability as the Code Red I worm, but differs in
behavior.
Code Red II opened several backdoors on the compromised machines. A
copy of the command shell cmd.exe was put in a publicly accessible directory
on the web server, allowing intruders to execute arbitrary commands on
the infected machine with the privileges of the IIS process. A modified
explorer.exe was installed to expose the C: and D: drives through the web
server. This gave an attacker full access to the two hard drives via the web
server [15, 30].
The worm utilizes an island hopping technique, as described in 3.1.1, which
means that it has a preference for local IP addresses when selecting potential
victims. Code Red II uses the following probabilities when selecting IP
addresses [30]:
• There is a one in two chance that a given scan is against an IP address
in the same class A network (similar starting byte as the attacking
host’s address) as the scanning node.
• There is a three in eight chance that a given scan is against an IP
address in the same class B network (the two first bytes of the addresses
are similar) as the scanning node.
• There is a one in eight chance that a given scan will be against a
randomly selected IP address.
3.3.4 Nimda
The Nimda worm, which was released in September 2001, could infect both
user workstations (clients) and web servers running the most common Mi-
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crosoft operating systems. It uses multiple attack vectors to propagate, as
listed below:
• From client to client through email or through shared network drives.
• From web server to client through browsing of compromised Internet
sites.
• From client to web server by active scanning for directory traversal
vulnerabilities in several IIS versions and for backdoors left by other
worms, such as Code Red II.
The Nimda worm will also infect existing binaries on the infected system by
making Trojan horse versions. When these executables are run, they will
first execute the Nimda code (if executed through a shared network drive
this would infect a new host), and then complete the program’s intended
function [31]. When infecting web servers, the worm will alter all web pages
(e.g., html, php and asp files) on the server to include a small javascript.
This script will automatically run the Nimda worm on the client machine if
one of the given pages are visited.
Due to a vulnerability in the HTML rendering in earlier versions of Internet
Explorer (5.5 and earlier), the attachment sent by the Nimda worm was
automatically executed if the mail was previewed by a mail client such as
MS Outlook. Once executed, the machine was infected and would send out
new e-mails and scan for vulnerable web servers as listed in the attack vector
list above.
As for Code Red II, the Nimda worm uses an island hopping technique. It
selects its target IP addresses based on the following probabilities:
• There is a one in two chance that a given scan is against an IP address
in the same class B network as the scanning node.
• There is a one in four chance that a given scan is against an IP address
in the same class A network as the scanning node.
• There is a one in four chance that a given scan is against a random IP
address.
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This preference for local addresses during the scanning routine caused denial-
of-service conditions on local networks where many computers were in-
fected [31].
3.3.5 SQL Slammer
The worm known as SQL Slammer6 managed to infect more than 90 percent
of the vulnerable hosts within ten minutes after the initial attack on the 25th
of January 2003 [3].
The Slammer worm exploited a buffer overflow in Microsoft SQL Server
2000 and managed to spread extremely quickly due to the fact that it was
based on a single UDP packet, and that its payload was as small as 376
bytes [32]. An infected machine would simply send as many UDP packets
containing the worm payload to random IP addresses as possible, thus using
a large amount of bandwidth. Since any vulnerable host receiving one of
these packets would start doing the same thing, an extremely high share
of the Internet traffic on the 25th of January 2003 was generated by this
worm. In fact, the Slammer worm generated so much traffic that five of the
13 root-name servers on the Internet crashed this day [33].
3.3.6 W32/Blaster Worm
TheW32/Blaster (also referred to as MsBlast, Lovsan or Lovesan) worm first
appeared on the 11th of August 2003. It exploited a known buffer overflow
vulnerability7 in the Microsoft Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Interface [35].
Once the worm has gained access to a new host, it attempts to download a
copy of the file msblast.exe, which contains the actual worm payload, from
the compromising host. If successful, the file is executed and the newly
infected host will start scanning the Internet address space sequentially for
other vulnerable systems to infect.
6This worm has also been called Slammer, W32.Slammer and Sapphire.
7CERT published an advisory (CA-2003-16) concerning this vulnerability one month
before the Blaster worm was released [34].
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The main intention of the Blaster worm was to launch a DDoS attack against
http://www.windowsupdate.com. This attack was scheduled to start on the
16th of the month in January to August, or any day in September through
December [36]. However, the damage on the windows update server was
minimal because the worm’s target was http://www.windowsupdate.com,
and not http://windowsupdate.microsoft.com to which the first url was
redirected. By temporarily shutting down the server hosting http://www.
windowsupdate.com on the day of the first attack, Microsoft successfully
avoided to expose the real server to the DDoS attack.
3.4 Future Worms
As new tools for detecting and stopping worms are created, future worms
need to evolve to be able to reach as many vulnerable hosts as possible.
Researchers have outlined several strategies future worms can adopt to evade
detection, and some of these strategies have even been used already. This
section presents some possible properties of future worms.
3.4.1 Polymorphic Worm
Worms that are able to change their packet signature between propagation
attempts, may avoid being detected by signature-based detectors. As these
kinds of detectors are in widespread use today, due to their efficient pro-
tection against known attacks and their ease of deployment, polymorphism
is likely to become a widely used property in the near future [37]. In fact,
there already exist several tools and methods for changing the worm signa-
tures dynamically between attacks. One example is the tool ADMmutate,
developed by a hacker called K2 [15].
Worm polymorphism can be achieved with different techniques. Obfusca-
tion, such as simply changing the order of the instructions in the worm
payload or inserting a NOP sledge8, is one of the most primitive ways of
8NOP or NOOP is an assembly language instruction that stands for no operation. A
series of NOPs is called a NOP sledge.
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achieving payload variations. A more advanced approach is to use encryp-
tion and encrypt the worm payload with different keys prior to each propa-
gation attempt. Although this technique may create different payloads each
time the worm propagates, it is likely that some parts of the payload, like
the decryption routine, has to remain unaltered in each packet [38].
Anomaly-based detectors, although prone to generate extensive logs, may
detect polymorphic worms. However, advanced polymorphic worms that
gather a normal traffic profile and use this to mutate, can evade detection
by both signature-based and anomaly-based detectors [39].
3.4.2 Warhol Model
Nicholas Weaver proposed a new model for worm propagation shortly after
the release of the Code Red worm in 2001 [15]. His model was called the
Warhol model, and it was argued that a worm following this model could
reach all vulnerable hosts connected to the Internet within no more than 15
minutes9. Three properties are needed for a worm to fit the Warhol model:
Hitlist scanning. The list is split between nodes during infection.
Permutated scanning. A pseudo-random range of addresses is generated,
and each node is given a range in which to scan for new victims. If
a node reaches another host that is already infected, the worm is an-
swered by a signal telling it to stop. The probing worm will then either
stop scanning completely or start scanning the Internet randomly in-
stead.
Coordination between worm nodes. This is done by splitting the hitlists
between worm nodes, and by giving probing worms a signal when they
scan already infected hosts. In addition, a communication network
could be set up between nodes, allowing the worm to act as a single
distributed system.
9The name of the model is inspired by the famous Andy Warhol quote: ”In the future,
everyone will be world-famous for 15 minutes.”
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3.4.3 Flash Worm
A flash worm is an extension to the Warhol model, where the main difference
is that a flash worm is introduced into the network from several points in
the initial stage as opposed to one point in the Warhol model. In addition,
these first hosts are chosen carefully, because of the high bandwidth needed
to upload the large hitlists in the initial stage of propagation.
Staniford et al. [40] have shown that a flash worm having all the properties
outlined above could spread to 3 million vulnerable hosts in less than 30
seconds.
3.4.4 Jumping Executable Worm
A jumping executable is a simple worm that propagates at a very low rate.
The basic property of a jumping executable is that the worm is only active
on one single node at a time. When the worm manages to compromise a new
node, it simply transfers the executable to the new node and ceases activity
on the parent node. In this way, it can stay below the detection thresholds
of many intrusion detection systems.
Although this kind of worm will not propagate at a very high rate, it can
still cause a lot of damage to important corporate or government networks,
since it could spread to many computers without being detected [15].
3.4.5 Curious Yellow
Inspired by the Warhol model, Brandon Wiley has proposed the first coor-
dinated worm design – the Curious Yellow [41].
To avoid requiring all instances of the worm to be aware of all other instances
(which would lead to a disproportionate use of bandwidth), the coordination
between the worms is based on a distributed hash tables (DHT) design called
AChord (Anonymous Chord). AChord provides several properties for the
worm network:
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• Each node in the network is reachable from all other nodes in the
network through no more than O(log N)10 intervening nodes.
• Each node has to keep track of no more than O(log N) other nodes.
• It is very difficult for any node to find out the identities of all the
other nodes in the network, making it hard to disable the network by
discovering the identity of nodes.
This coordinated worm design introduces many advantages compared to
other, non-coordinated worms. First, only one instance of the worm will
scan each potential target. This will both reduce the load on the network
compared to a worm utilizing a normal scanning technique and reduce the
chance of being detected by an IDS. Second, the worm instances may be
updated very quickly with new patches either to exploit newly discovered
vulnerabilities or to change the signature of the worm to evade future de-
tection.
10Where N is the number of worm nodes.
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Chapter 4
Worm Countermeasures
A worm countermeasure is, for the purpose of this thesis, defined as an action
taken to slow or stop the propagation of a worm. This chapter presents two
groups of worm countermeasures, namely detection and protection.
4.1 Worm Detection
Nearly all the techniques for detecting worms that have been published in
recent years benefit from the fact that the network traffic generated by
worms are somewhat different then the legitimate traffic present. As worms
propagate, they are likely to initiate a lot of outbound connections. In
addition, most worms send out packets with almost identical payload to all
its victims, making it possible to detect it by simply looking for many similar
packets.
This section describes two of the most recently published methods for de-
tecting worms using honeypots; HoneyComb and HoneyStat. In addition,
the worm detection architecture called Sweetbait that utilizes HoneyComb
for worm detection is decribed. The final part of this section summarizes
some of the existing methods that are not using honeypots.
37
Worm Countermeasures
4.1.1 HoneyComb
Kreibich et al. [42] describes an automated signature generation tool known
as HoneyComb. HoneyComb is a plug-in for the open source low-interaction
honeypot Honeyd.
The name of the tool implies that it is combing for patterns in the honeypot
traffic [sli]. By examining traffic inside the Honeyd honeypot at different lev-
els in the protocol hierarchy and using a pattern-matching algorithm known
as the longest common substring (LCS), HoneyComb is able to detect pre-
viously unknown attacks and automatically generate IDS signatures.
The detection algorithm is based on the fact that most worms propagate by
sending an extensive amount of packets to multiple hosts containing iden-
tical or very similar payloads. Every incoming packet on an established
connection is compared to packets of other stored connections1 to the same
destination port. This is done in two different ways: horizontally and verti-
cally.
Horizontal detection between traffic flows is performed by comparing all
messages at the same depth2 in the flow to each other. The messages
are passed as input to the LCS algorithm in pairs, as illustrated in
Figure 4.1.
Vertical detection is carried out by concatenating several messages from
one packet stream into a string and comparing this with a correspond-
ing concatenated string from another traffic flow, as depicted in Fig-
ure 4.2.
Signatures generated by HoneyComb have the following format:
alert protocol ipsrc srcport -> ipdst dstport (msg: "Honeycomb
date and time "; flags: ; flow: ; content: "");
The flags field represents the corresponding enabled flags in the IP header,
1The number of stored connections can be specified in the configuration file. When the
number of connections exceeds this specified limit, old connections are dropped to make
room for new ones.
2Two messages are said to be at the same depth if they are at corresponding positions
in the sequence of packets forming their respective connections.
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Figure 4.1: Horizontal pattern detection between traffic flows.
Figure 4.2: Vertical pattern detection between traffic flows.
while the flow field indicates whether a connection is established or not. The
content field represents the match found by the LCS algorithm.
As HoneyComb is limited to the longest common substring algorithm, a
worm camouflaging its payload could potentially evade detection. Another
drawback with this algorithm is that it is quite resource-demanding. Per-
formance tests conclude that, despite a significant performance overhead,
the system can be run without problems on honeypots not experiencing too
high a traffic load [42].
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Sweetbait
Georgios Portokalidis describes a system for worm detection and contain-
ment called Sweetbait that utilizes HoneyComb to create signatures for un-
known worms [43, 44].
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the system is comprised of several honeypots,
network intrusion detection and prevention (NID and NIP) sensors, several
local and a global control centre. The honeypots’ role in this system is
to detect new worms and create signatures that can be monitored by the
network intrusion detection and prevention sensors. In addition to detecting
and preventing new attacks on the network, these sensors report the activity
level of each signature to the local control centre. The local control centre
will in its turn decide which signatures the sensors should check for in the
traffic. This will prevent the signature pool at each sensor from growing
too large, keeping the throughput at an acceptable level. The local control
centre will also report its stored signatures, and activity level of each of
these to the global control centre. The global control centre correlates all
the information it receives and distributes this information back to the local
control centers, making them able to react to a global worm outbreak even
before the worm reaches the local network.
The actual worm detection mechanism in this architecture is based on the
low-interaction honeypot Honeyd with the plug-in HoneyComb for anomaly
detection and signature creation. Portokalidis also introduces a new plug-in
to Honeyd, called HoneyBounce, that makes it possible to whitelist3 internal
traffic to reduce the number of false positives. In addition, the signatures
generated by HoneyComb are correlated in order to produce more general-
ized signatures.
3The process of filtering out non-malicious traffic that does not need to be processed
by the anomaly detector is often referred to as whitelisting.
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Figure 4.3: The Sweetbait architecture.
4.1.2 HoneyStat
HoneyStat [45] uses another approach to detect worms in local networks.
Unlike HoneyComb, which utilizes a longest common substring algorithm
to search for similarities in packet payloads, the detection technique used
by HoneyStat is based on a typical worm infection cycle. Dagon et al. [45]
identifies three type of events that worms are likely to trigger during an
infection:
Memory events Nearly all worms exploit software vulnerabilities when
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infecting new hosts. The most common of these vulnerabilities that
can lead to an exploit is the buffer overflow.
Network events In addition to the network traffic generated when propa-
gating, some worms need to download the actual worm payload after
infecting a new host.
Disk events Many worms write their payload to disk to make sure the
worm is still operative after a computer restart. In addition, some
worms alter existing binaries or other files to make trojan versions of
itself.
The HoneyStat detection system will typically consist of several high-interaction
honeypots emulated with VMware [VMW]. Because of the need to cover a
large address space (the larger the address space the larger the probability
of experiencing worm traffic) the honeypots are also multihomed4.
Unlike HoneyComb, whose main purpose is to generate IDS signatures for
unknown attacks, the honeypots in HoneyStat are configured to capture
relevant data when any of the above mentioned events are triggered. This
data includes the operating system and patch level of the honeypot host, and
specific event data like stack state for memory events and outgoing packets
for network events [45]. In addition, a trace file of network activity prior to
the actual event is logged.
By correlating the captured data between similar events, one can efficiently
detect worm outbreaks in a local network. The HoneyStat approach cannot
only detect zero-day worms, but also provide detailed description about the
worm’s behavior due to the extensive logging capabilities.
4.1.3 Other Methods
A worm detection system developed by IBM, called Billy Goat, also utilizes
honeypot-like technology to detect worms [46]. The primary intention of
this detection system is, however, not to detect unknown worms, but rather
4A host with more than one IP address is said to be multihomed. All mainstream
operating systems support multihoming, e.g., Windows NT allows up to 32 addresses [45].
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to alert, with a zero false positive rate, network administrators of known
worms present in their network.
Singh et al. [47] propose an automated system for detecting new worms and
creating signatures known as the EarlyBird. This system aims at detecting
worms based on three traffic characteristics common to most worms;
• Highly repetitive packet content.
• An increasing population of sources generating infections.
• An increasing number of destinations being targeted.
Akritidis et al. [48] present a worm detection technique that is based on four
properties possessed by most worms:
• Diversity of destination - the worms are spread to as many victims as
possible.
• Spread by clients - the worms are usually spread by clients, i.e., by
computers that initiate connections.
• Payload repetition - the packets belonging to the same worm contain
similar packet payload.
• Small size - worms tend to be small in size in order to spread as fast
as possible.
Wang et al. [49] base their worm detection scheme, PAYL, solely on cor-
relating anomalous incoming and outgoing packet content. The motivation
for this is that most worms infect new hosts with somewhat similar payload
as they used to infect the present host. The system compares incoming and
outgoing packets to a host and will in this way be able to detect and generate
signatures for zero-day worms.
Zou et al. [50] describes an early warning system for Internet worms based on
the assumption that the worms follow an epidemic model. Using a recursive
filtering algorithm known as a Kalman filter, this system is able to detect
the presence of a worm early in its propagation phase by monitoring trend
changes in illegitimate scans to large IP networks. However, this detection
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technique is best suited for large data sets and may not be appropriate when
detecting worms in small networks [51].
An architecture known as Shadow Honeypots is introduced by Anagnostakis
et al. [52]. In this architecture, several anomaly detectors are placed in front
of a production network to monitor all incoming traffic. Packets that are
regarded as anomalous by these detectors are forwarded to the ”shadow
honeypots” that are protected replicas of the production system they are
trying to protect. Legitimate traffic is validated by the shadow honeypots
and processed in a normal way by the production servers, while traffic that
is part of a possible attack will be identified and blocked. The fact that this
system is placed in front of a production system, instead of only listening to
unused address space, makes it well suited for detecting hitlist worms5.
Madhusudan et al. [53] introduce a system for real-time worm detection
using hardware. The detection strategy in this system is based on two ideas
presented in the EarlyBird article [47]:
• A worm detection system should look for frequently occurring content.
• The system should also be able to detect worms that use simple poly-
morphic techniques.
This detection system has promise since it is implemented in hardware and is
able to process packet content even on high bandwidth networks. However,
the detection algorithm itself may prove to be too simple, as it is unable
to detect worms using more sophisticated polymorphic techniques such as
instruction reordering or replacement.
4.2 Worm Protection
There are several different ways of protecting a computer against worm
attacks and other kind of malicious traffic. One of the most intuitive ones is
to keep every computer updated with the latest security patches at all times.
However, evaluating patches and upgrading systems is time consuming and
5Assuming that the hitlist worm is targeting the given production system.
44
4.2 Worm Protection
may cause downtime that is unacceptable to some systems [15]. In addition,
many worms utilize unknown vulnerabilities not targeted by the security
updates. The remainder of this section will give a brief overview of some
possible defense strategies against these worms, separated into network and
host-based approaches.
4.2.1 Network Defenses
Network firewalls are devices that enforce a local network security policy
to block unwanted traffic entering and leaving a network [15]. There are
three common types of firewalls: packet filtering routers, application-level
gateways and circuit-level gateways, each of which filters traffic based on
different criteria [18]. A packet-filtering router decides whether or not to
forward or discard an incoming or outgoing packet based on a set of rules
regarding the packet header (e.g., source IP address). An application-level
gateway filters traffic based on the application that is being used. Circuit-
level gateways do not allow end-to-end TCP connections, which mean that
the filtering is based on which connections to allow through the gateway
(typically based on trust of the internal users). Once a connection has
been established, the gateway acts as a traffic relay without examining the
content.
Firewalls can provide worm protection at a certain level, but may turn out to
be inadequate when fighting worms entering the network through legitimate
applications. As once stated by William R. Cheswick: a firewall is ”a sort
of crunchy shell around a soft, chewy center” [54].
Network intrusion detection systems monitor incoming and outgoing net-
work traffic looking for unusual activity that could be part of an attack.
Port scanning activity and incoming packets containing shell code are ex-
amples of events that can trigger alerts from detection systems. The NIDS
can also provide the firewall with new signatures and IP addresses to include
in its blacklist6.
6Traffic from certain IP addresses is blocked entering the network. A list of these IP
addresses is often referred to as a blacklist.
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4.2.2 Host-Based Defenses
A host-based intrusion detection system monitors the user activity and the
system’s state. This type of intrusion detection system is able to detect and
respond to irregular behavior by the user, as well as processes that try to
execute commands they are not supposed to.
A host-based firewall can serve as a complement to a network firewall, pro-
viding more fine-grained control of what services and traffic to allow for
each host [15]. While the network firewall has to allow traffic to all appli-
cations used in the network, the host-based firewall can block all traffic to
applications not used on the host.
Virus detection software uses signatures to search for malicious software in
files present on the computer. If a file with malicious code is discovered, the
virus detection software will put it in quarantine or remove it. Anti-virus
software can be configured to search for threats based on different events,
e.g., prior to execution of each binary file, every time a file is sent as an
attachment in an e-mail or simply on a regular basis. With a signature-based
detection system like this, it is vital that the virus and worm definitions are
kept updated at all times.
As stated in the previous chapter, worms utilize security flaws in widely
used services to propagate. By always running network processes with a
minimum set of privileges, a worm infection might be avoided. On UNIX
systems, administrative rights are needed to begin actively listening on the
ports between 1 and 1024 [29]. Due to this, every program that needs to use
one of these ports requires root privileges to bind itself to the port. However,
once the binding is completed, the program does no longer need the escalated
privileges. Making sure that all processes drop the administrative privileges
when they are no longer needed can help protect the computer against worm
infections.
Running applications in a protected environment, often referred to as a
sandbox environment, may also provide the necessary protection to avoid
worm infections. This is typically done by the UNIX system call chroot()
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which only presents a restricted subset of the real file system to the running
process [15]. The number of tools and libraries available in the sandbox are
also minimized to reduce the chance for a worm to elevate privileges.
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Chapter 5
Worm Detection
Experiments
This chapter describes the experiments conducted in this project. First, the
software tools used for the experiments and the analysis of the captured
data is presented. Second, setup and implementation of the experiments are
presented along with analysis of the collected data.
Prior to running the experiments, two hosts were added to the honeypot
setup installed at NTNU to incorporate a worm detection mechanism. Three
experiments were then conducted to evaluate the effectiveness and reliability
of this worm detection mechanism.
5.1 Software Tools
This section describes the software tools used in the experiments as well
as the ones used for the analysis of the collected data. A configuration
guide for the use of these software tools on the honeypot setup at NTNU
is given in [6]. The configuration of the newly incorporated worm detection
mechanism can be found in Appendix C.
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5.1.1 Experiment Tools
A short description of all the software tools needed to conduct the experi-
ments is given in this section.
Arpd
An Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) daemon is needed to make the ma-
chine running Honeyd able to answer ARP requests beyond the one IP ad-
dress assigned to the physical Media Access Control (MAC) address of the
computer’s network interface card. The ARP daemon replies to any ARP
request for a predefined set of IP addresses (after determining that no other
host in the network is claiming that IP), thus facilitating the deployment of
several low-interaction honeypots on one physical host machine.
Flowreplay
Flowreplay [Flo] is a tool able to emulate a network client by replaying a
traffic trace and at the same time making sure the packets that are sent have
the correct header fields (e.g., the sequence number and acknowledgement
value). According to the developer, this tool is not yet stable and is still an
alpha version.
HoneyComb
HoneyComb is a plug-in for Honeyd that searches for common byte patterns
in packet payload to automatically create detailed signatures for worms. A
detailed description of HoneyComb is already given in 4.1.1.
Honeyd
Honeyd [Hona] is a low-interaction honeypot daemon that can emulate thou-
sands of virtual hosts at the same time. By opening different TCP/UDP
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ports and adding scripts to emulate services on the open ports, each of these
virtual hosts can be configured individually.
Iptables
Iptables [Netb] is used for packet filtering on Linux systems, and can thus
be used as a firewall to protect the host from unwanted traffic. In the
experiments, Iptables is set up to accept only a limited set of services for
the host machines, while no filtering is performed on the traffic bound to
the low-interaction honeypots.
Netdude
Netdude [Neta] is a Linux GUI application for inspection, analysis and ma-
nipulation of Tcpdump traffic trace files. The tool allows copying of packets
between traffic traces as well as editing of captured packets.
Network Time Protocol (NTP) time synchronization
Two tools utilizing the Network Time Protocol, Ntpdate and Ntpd, are used
to keep the system clock synchronized at all times on the computers used
in the experiments. Ntpdate is executed when the machine is started to
correct large time differences, while Ntpd is a daemon running continuously
to keep the times synchronized.
Oinkmaster
Oinkmaster [Oin] is a Perl script that updates the Snort rule set with the
latest rules from an online repository. This is especially useful when con-
ducting experiments on several machines, making sure the same detection
rules are used on all of them.
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PackETH
PackETH [Pac] is a Linux application for creating and sending any Ether-
net packet. A sequence tool is also available, making it possible to send a
sequence of predefined packets.
Snort
Snort [Sno] is a signature-driven network intrusion detection and prevention
system. In the experiments conducted in this project, Snort operates as a
NIDS, allowing packets to travel to their destination addresses, but creating
alerts when the packet payload match a signature in the rule set. Snort can
also be run in inline-mode, operating as a NIPS, completely blocking traffic
that matches any of the rules. This operating mode can be used to contain
known computer worms.
Tcpdump
The Tcpdump [Tcp] tool is used to monitor traffic to and from a computer,
utilizing the libpcap library. The packets received can be printed to the
screen or stored in trace files, convenient for later analysis.
5.1.2 Analysis Tools
A brief introduction of the tools used to analyze the results of the experi-
ments is given in this section.
Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE)
BASE [BAS], which is based on code from the Analysis Console for Intrusion
Databases (ACID) project [ACI], provides a web front-end to query and
analyze the alerts generated by Snort, which can be useful when, for example,
sorting alerts based on their timestamps.
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Ethereal
Ethereal [Eth] is a network protocol analyzer that can be used to display the
contents of a Tcpdump traffic trace. Filters can easily be applied in order to
display, for example, packets addressed to a certain IP address or utilizing
a specific protocol.
Tcpslice
Tcpslice can be used to split Tcpdump traffic traces into smaller files based
on time intervals. This is convenient because the viewing of large trace files
in Ethereal is resource-demanding.
Tcpstat
Tcpstat is a program that reports network interface statistics of real-time
traffic, or of traffic captured in Tcpdump files. It is especially valuable
because of its filtering capabilities. It was used during the analysis to get
statistics of traffic from the Tcpdump files.
5.2 Problems with HoneyComb
Several obstacles were encountered in the process of setting up and con-
ducting experiments with HoneyComb. The first problem was experienced
as the newest version (version 0.6) failed to compile with Honeyd version
1.5a. Christian Kreibich, the developer of HoneyComb, was contacted and
replied by fixing the problem and releasing version 0.7 of HoneyComb. This
version compiled with Honeyd 1.5a without errors, but caused Honeyd to
crash whenever a UDP packet was received to any of the honeypots. To lo-
cate the problem, Honeyd was executed in a controlled environment1 which
provided a backtrace of the problem at the time of the crash. This back
1The GNU Project Debugger [Deb].
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trace was sufficient for Kreibich to locate the error and release a prelimi-
nary2 new version of the library libstree needed by HoneyComb to run
the LCS algorithm [55].
When running small test experiments, HoneyComb provided strange results,
and it did not seem as if HoneyComb interpreted the received traffic cor-
rectly. Adding several debug messages in the source code of HoneyComb
confirmed this assumption. As HoneyComb was developed in 2003, it was
suspected that the newer versions of Honeyd might have introduced this
error in HoneyComb. This turned out to be the most likely explanation, as
the only available version of Honeyd providing HoneyComb with the correct
information was version 0.8b released in 2004. Detailed debug information
about the experienced errors was sent to Kreibich, but as of this writing no
new version of HoneyComb has been released [55].
While thoroughly examining the HoneyComb source code, a limitation in the
implementation was identified. Because HoneyComb deals with UDP and
TCP packets in a similar fashion, an unwanted effect is introduced when
detecting single packet UDP worms.
To understand this limitation, knowledge of the TCP and UDP protocols
are required. TCP connections are normally set up by a three-way hand-
shake before the actual information exchange can start, while UDP traffic is
connectionless. HoneyComb deals with TCP connections correctly and per-
forms no extensive comparison of the first packet in a connection with older
connections. Instead, only packet header comparison is performed. Honey-
Comb deals with UDP packets in a similar fashion, viewing UDP packets
with the same header fields3 as a ”UDP connection”.
The limitation of this approach can be illustrated by an example4, as shown
in Figure 5.1. In this scenario, it is assumed that a UDP worm, that ran-
domly scans the Internet for new hosts to infect, exists. It is further assumed
2The updated libstree version was not released as an official new version due to
Kreibich’s suspicion that a memory leakage may have been introduced.
3The same source address, source port, destination address and destination port.
4This example is a result of a short experiment conducted on the 13th of May to prove
the limitation of HoneyComb when dealing with UDP worms. Complete results from this
experiment can be found on the attached DVD.
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that the compromised hosts all send one packet to each of the honeypots
containing the actual worm payload, as indicated by the dotted arrows in the
figure. HoneyComb receives all these packets, but since they are all initial
packets of a connection, no payload comparison is performed. An example
of a signature generated by HoneyComb in this case is given below.
alert udp any any -> 129.241.196.0/24 1434 (msg: "Honeycomb Sat
May 13 10h34m14 2006 "; )
To trigger a payload comparison in this scenario, one of the compromised
hosts will need to send a second UDP packet containing the worm payload
to one of the honeypots, as illustrated by the solid red arrow in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Limitation in HoneyComb’s processing of UDP packets.
To improve this situation, making HoneyComb able to detect UDP worms
after only receiving two instances of the worm (given that the two packets
either have distinct source or destination addresses), the source code was
altered and the program was recompiled. The method in the C source file
that was altered is included in Appendix D. The entire source file, hc udp.c,
can be found on the attached DVD. All the following experiments in this
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master’s thesis are conducted with the altered source code.
During one of the experiments, a significant error regarding the implemen-
tation of LCS used by HoneyComb was discovered. This will be further
elaborated in 5.5 and 5.6.
5.3 Experiment Objectives
The purposes of the experiments conducted during the work on this thesis
are to evaluate the effectiveness and reliability of the HoneyComb approach;
detecting worms using a longest common substring algorithm. The aspects
considered are listed below:
Signature accuracy How accurate are the signatures generated by Hon-
eyComb?
Polymorphic worm resistance Can the algorithm resist simple polymor-
phic techniques used to change the worm payload between propagation
attempts?
Live traffic results What signatures will be generated by HoneyComb on
the NTNU and Uninett network?
False positives Is the amount of false positives at an acceptable level?
To test HoneyComb it was decided to conduct three different experiments.
Two of these were conducted in a controlled environment, while HoneyComb
was fed with live traffic from the NTNU and Uninett network in the third.
5.4 Signature Accuracy Experiment
The main goal of this experiment, which was conducted on the 14th of May
2006, was to test the accuracy of the signatures created by HoneyComb by
sending actual worms to Honeyd in a controlled environment. To test both
TCP and UDP detection functionality in HoneyComb, two worms, each
using one of these protocols, were needed.
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During the experiments conducted in [6], a significant amount of the UDP
Slammer worm traffic was captured. As no TCP worm was captured during
these experiments, the full payload of Code Red II was found and down-
loaded from the Internet [pay].
5.4.1 Setup and Implementation
The experiment setup is depicted in Figure 5.2, where the three computers
described below are connected through a switch.
Figure 5.2: System setup for the controlled environment experiment.
Blade (129.241.205.108) - Running Debian. The centralized machine for
databases, web interface and data storage for the experiments.
• Iptables 1.3.3
• Mysql 4.0.24
• Ntpdate 4.2.0a
• Openntpd 3.7
• Tcpslice 1.2a2
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• Apache 1.3.33
• BASE 1.1.2
Homer (129.241.196.197) - Running Fedora Core 3. Emulating Honeyd hon-
eypots running Windows or Linux. The Windows honeypots were set up
with scripts emulating ftp and web server as well as several backdoors cre-
ated by Mydoom, Kuang2, Sasser, Dabber, Lovgate and Blaster. The Linux
honeypots were configured with scripts emulating ftp, web server, smtp, ssh
and proxy server. A list of the IP addresses of the honeypots as well as the
operating system emulated can be found in Appendix E.
• Iptables 1.2.11
• Ntpdate 4.2.0a
• Ntpd 4.2.0a
• Honeyd 0.8b
• HoneyComb 0.7
• Tcpdump 3.8
Elektra (129.241.209.110) - Running Ubuntu 5.10. Replaying traffic dumps
and sending generated worm packets.
• Iptables 1.3.1
• PackETH 1.3
• Flowreplay 2.3.5
• Netdude 0.4.6
The UDP and TCP worm packets were sent from Elektra to the Honeyd
honeypots run on Homer using the applications PackETH and Flowreplay,
respectively.
To emulate a real TCP worm, a TCP connection had to be set up before the
actual worm payload could be transmitted. Two separate traffic dumps, the
TCP connection establishment and the worm payload transmission, respec-
tively, were combined using Netdude to create a valid Code Red II trace.
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As the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of an Ethernet frame is fixed
to 1500 bytes, the Code Red II payload had to be fragmented into three
IP packets. The creation of the Code Red II trace in Netdude is shown in
Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Creation of a Code Red II trace in Netdude.
To trigger HoneyComb to generate a signature for this worm, two similar
Code Red II traces were sent to two distinct honeypots using Flowreplay.
As indicated in 5.1.1, Flowreplay is not fully developed. Due to problems
trying to send UDP packets and TCP packets in the same trace, the Slammer
packets were sent using the sequence tool in PackETH. Two packets were
sent to two distinct honeypots to generate a signature for the Slammer worm.
The PackETH sequence tool is illustrated in Figure 5.4.
5.4.2 Results
Extracts of the signatures generated by HoneyComb in this experiment is
shown below.
Signature for the Code Red II worm:
alert tcp 129.241.209.110/32 any -> 129.241.196.0/24 80 (msg: "Honey-
comb Sun May 14 13h17m10 2006 "; flags: PA+; flow: established; con-
tent: "GET /default.ida?XXXXXXXX (...) 00|CodeRedII|00 (...) F7 D8";)
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Figure 5.4: The PackETH sequence tool.
Signature for the UDP Slammer worm:
alert udp 129.241.208.0/24 1023 -> 129.241.196.0/24 1434 (msg: "Hon-
eycomb Sun May 14 13h17m15 2006 "; content: "|04 01 (...) D6 EB|"; )
A comparison of the signature content and the worm payload sent to the
honeypots shows that HoneyComb generates accurate signatures in a con-
trolled environment.
The complete signatures generated by HoneyComb in this experiment can
be found in Appendix F.1. The traffic traces that were used to generate the
worm traffic, as well as all the log files from the experiment can be found on
the enclosed DVD.
5.5 Polymorphic Payload Experiment
This experiment was conducted on the 12th of June 2006 to test if Honey-
Comb was able to detect simple polymorphic worms.
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5.5.1 Setup and Implementation
The machines used in this experiment were the same, and had the same set
of tools, as in the signature accuracy experiment described in 5.4.
As no real polymorphic worm was available, it was decided to construct
three different packets using the packet generator tool PackETH. The pay-
load of these packets were different, except one common byte string: 05 04
AB 45 32 69 AC BF. The entire payload of these packets can be found in
Appendix G. The worm behavior imitated using this approach is believed
to be quite similar to that of a simple polymorphic worm. That is, a worm
using instruction reordering, byte padding or encryption (with parts of the
payload, e.g., the decryption routine, unencrypted) to achieve payload vari-
ations between each propagation attempt.
The three packets were sent to three different honeypots on Homer from one
source IP addresses. To avoid the need of a connection setup, the packets
were sent using the UDP protocol.
5.5.2 Results
According to the documentation, HoneyComb identifies worms by running
the longest common substring on the payload of incoming packets sent to the
same port [42]. The expected result of this polymorphic payload experiment
was therefore that two packets having any common content larger than the
minimum pattern length variable5 would trigger HoneyComb to generate a
matching signature containing the longest common substring. The actual
results from this experiment did, however, not coincide with these predic-
tions. Actually, the signature generated after receiving two of the three
polymorphic packets contained the entire payload of the first packet.
After obtaining these results, several debug messages were added in the
source code of HoneyComb to help determine the reason for this behavior.
5This is the minimum pattern length that HoneyComb requires before it generates a
signature. In the experiments described in this thesis, this variable is set to 5 bytes.
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Short test experiments6 with both UDP and TCP traffic were then con-
ducted to check if both protocols were affected. The results showed that
the error was protocol independent. It also became evident that the error
was located somewhere in HoneyComb’s LCS implementation, as none of
the generated signatures were based on the longest common substring of
two packets. Rather, every result from the LCS algorithm was identical to
the longer of the two input strings, even if the two strings did not have
any common content at all. This was not discovered in the signature accu-
racy experiment, as the packets sent to HoneyComb in this experiment had
identical payload.
Since HoneyComb was unable to run appropriately with the older versions
of libstree, it is unclear whether or not this error has been introduced in
the preliminary new version. Due to the limited amount of time available,
and the fact that the LCS implementation consists of 3000 lines of code,
a thorough analysis of the code, with the purpose of removing the error,
is considered to be beyond the scope of this thesis. Detailed debugging
information regarding this error was sent to the developer of HoneyComb,
Christian Kreibich.
5.6 Live Traffic Experiment
The purpose of the experiment was to determine what kind of traffic Hon-
eyComb would generate signatures for in a live traffic environment as well
as to study the amount of false positives among the generated signatures7.
The live traffic experiment was conducted between the 29th of May 2006 and
the 5th of June 2006 in intervals of 24 hours. Because the error described
in 5.5 was not discovered until after the live traffic experiment was ended,
the results from this experiment are affected by HoneyComb’s erroneous
implementation of the LCS algorithm. The effects of this discovery is further
discussed in 5.6.2 and have been taken into consideration during the analysis
6The logs and traffic traces from these experiments can be found on the attached DVD.
7False negatives are not considered in this experiment because it would require a com-
plete overview of the incoming traffic.
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of the results.
5.6.1 Setup and Implementation
The system setup for this experiment is illustrated in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: System setup for the live traffic experiment.
Blade and Homer used the same set of tools as in the two previous experi-
ments. In addition, Calvin was deployed on the Uninett network.
Calvin (158.38.144.66) - Running Fedora Core 3. Using the same set of tools
as Homer, and emulating the Honeyd honeypots on the Uninett network.
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As NTNU removes some known attacks bound to hosts connected to their
network, honeypots placed in this network would receive a limited amount
of malicious traffic. Because the purpose of this experiment was to generate
signatures based on worm traffic, the filtering on the two subnetworks was
removed by ITEA and Uninett.
A gateway (el-gsw.ntnu.no) placed on the Uninett network multicasted a
specific packet every 30 seconds to all the honeypots deployed on the Uninett
network. These packets triggered the Snort alert BAD-TRAFFIC IP Proto
103 PIM. As reported in [5, 6], the packets do not seem to be malicious, so
it was decided to remove this rule from the Snort rule set.
After running longer test experiments with HoneyComb, it was found that
Honeyd ended up consuming the majority of the host’s memory resources.
This caused the process to crash a couple of days into the experiments. The
reason for this is believed to be the possible memory leakage introduced in
the preliminary version of libstree, as stated in 5.2. As a result, it was
decided to run the live experiments in intervals of 24 hours.
5.6.2 Results and Analysis
The error discovered during the polymorphic payload experiment affects the
results of the live traffic experiment. As stated in 5.5, HoneyComb is not
able to generate a signature based on an actual common substring of two
payloads. Rather, following the establishment of two distinct connections
to the same destination port, HoneyComb seems to generate a signature for
the packet with the largest payload, regardless of any matching substrings
in the two packets. This is also the case for any subsequent comparison
involving that particular destination port. The error causes the following
abnormal behavior:
• HoneyComb will not generate any signatures based on parts of a pay-
load, only on an entire payload of a packet. That is, it will never
generate generalized signatures that can help identify multiple packets
with only partly identical payloads.
64
5.6 Live Traffic Experiment
• The fact that HoneyComb is not able to generate generalized signa-
tures also leads to a potentially large number of generated signatures
based on packets with payload that contains connection-specific infor-
mation (e.g., source or destination IP address). These specific signa-
tures can only be used to identify packets for that particular connec-
tion. It is possible that the LCS algorithm would have helped generate
more general signatures, excluding the connection-specific parts of the
payloads, for these kinds of packets. It is only when two packets with
identical payload are captured on minimum two distinct connections
within a reasonable time interval that HoneyComb would have up-
dated the general signature to include the connection-specific part of
the payload.
• As HoneyComb seems to generate a signature based on the packet with
the longest payload, it is likely that the signatures with large content
are overrepresented compared to the ones with smaller content. In
order to generate a signature for a small packet, a packet of equal or
smaller length needs to arrive at the same destination port.
• Vertical detection, as described in 4.1.1, can result in signatures with
content consisting of multiple instances of a single packet payload.
This can happen when two or more packets with identical payload are
received on the same connection and concatenated in order to perform
vertical detection. As it is unlikely that any subsequent packets sent
to that destination port will contain a payload with multiple instances
of the payload in the packets already received, the signatures gener-
ated as a result of the vertical detection routine in this experiment are
redundant. Technically, this could also happen when using LCS with
HoneyComb, but it will happen much more frequently in this experi-
ment as the two concatenated flows that are compared do not have to
match in order for HoneyComb to produce a signature.
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Error margin caused by the lack of a functional LCS algorithm
Even though the LCS algorithm used by HoneyComb does not seem to have
worked properly during this experiment, the analysis showed that many
of the signatures were actually based on packets with identical payload.
Hence, a large part of the signatures generated in this experiment is likely
to have been generated with the use of LCS as well. This hypothesis is
further strengthened by the fact that HoneyComb was restarted every 24
hours, and thereby lost its memory, but still generated many of the same
signatures every day.
It is very difficult to accurately quantify the error margin caused by the lack
of a functional LCS algorithm for this experiment. To decide what generic
signatures HoneyComb would have generated by using LCS, an extensive
manual inspection of the captured traffic logs would be required. This is not
feasible given the vast amount of collected data and the time aspect of this
project.
The HoneyComb log files from this experiment show that a substantial
amount of the generated signatures contain some sort of connection-specific
information. By inspection of the data collected, it is evident that these
kinds of signatures would have been generated quite frequently with use of
LCS as well. The reason for this is that the packets with identical pay-
load tend to arrive within short time intervals (before the old connection is
dropped to make room for new connections).
Signature trend analysis
The number of unique signatures generated on the NTNU network is de-
picted in Figure 5.6, while the corresponding number for the Uninett net-
work is illustrated in Figure 5.78. A comparison of these figures shows that
the amount of signatures generated on the NTNU network is approximately
one order of magnitude larger than the number of generated signatures on
the Uninett network. The reason for this is the vast amount of distinct sig-
8The data behind these figures is presented in Appendix H.1
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natures based on UDP packets sent to port 1026 and 1027 received on the
NTNU network. When excluding these signatures, the number of signatures
generated each day is approximately the same on the two subnetworks.
Figure 5.6: HoneyComb signatures from the NTNU network.
Figure 5.7: HoneyComb signatures from the Uninett network.
The peak in Figure 5.6 is caused by the same UDP packets as mentioned
above. In fact, over 27.000 of the almost 32.000 unique signatures reported
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on the NTNU network during the first day of the experiment are generated
based on these kinds of packets.
What signatures will be generated by HoneyComb on the NTNU
and Uninett network?
Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 show the top five types of signatures generated
on the NTNU and Uninett network, respectively. The signature types have
been given names based on characteristic parts of their payload. Examples of
the signature types described in this section can be found in Appendix F.2.
Figure 5.8: The most frequently generated signatures on the NTNU network.
The most frequently generated type of signature on the NTNU network is,
by far, the Msreg. This type of signature constitutes almost 90 % of the
total amount of unique signatures generated on this subnetwork during the
live traffic experiment. Although these signatures are also generated on
the Uninett network, they are far less prominent on this subnetwork. The
reason for this is that the NTNU network seems to experience a significantly
larger amount of the traffic causing these signatures compared to the Uninett
network. It is, however, unclear why the NTNU network seems to be more
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Figure 5.9: The most frequently generated signatures on the Uninett net-
work.
exposed to this kind of traffic. Since the data in this experiment is collected
over a relatively short period of time, longer experiments could be conducted
to find out if the NTNU network actually is more susceptible to this kind of
traffic compared to the Uninett network.
The Msreg signature is based on packets sent to UDP ports 1026 and 1027
on the honeypots running Windows. These ports are used by the Microsoft
Messenger Service9, a service introduced in Windows NT to allow network
users to send each other short pop-up alerts. The protocol has become
widely used by spammers and these kinds of packets are often referred to as
messenger spam [myN02].
The Msreg signatures generated in this experiment are based on packets
causing a pop-up alert on the screen that tells the user that the Windows
registry is corrupted. The user is then referred to a web site, http://www.
msreg.com, with similarities to the official Windows update web site. Here,
9Although similar names, the Microsoft Messenger Service has nothing to do with
Microsoft’s instant messaging services – Windows Messenger and MSN Messenger.
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the user is offered a registry repair for free. In reality, it is much more likely
that the software will install spyware or backdoors on the system.
The packets that cause this signature generate no alerts in Snort. One
of the reasons why HoneyComb generates such a large number of unique
signatures of this type is that most of the packets have similar, but not
identical payload. Another reason could be the nonfunctional LCS algorithm
used by HoneyComb. Even though it is likely that many of the specific
signatures would have been generated anyway, the erroneous implementation
of the LCS algorithm may have lead to a significantly increased number of
these signatures.
The vast amount of signatures generated could indicate worm activity. How-
ever, because human interaction is needed for a host to become infected, it
cannot be considered a worm according to the definition used in this thesis.
The signature type referred to as Slammer, represents signatures that have
been generated based on packets containing the payload of the SQL Slammer
worm. These packets are identified by Snort, and trigger the IDS to generate
two distinct alerts, namely MS-SQL Worm propagation attempt and MS-
SQL version overflow attempt. During the entire experiment, a Slammer
packet is received at least once every five minutes. This is the most frequent
attack reported by Snort, and, in fact, 65 % of all the alerts generated during
the experiments are related to this worm.
By studying the alerts, it is clear that the number of Slammer packets is
almost evenly distributed on the two subnetworks and that the worm has
tried to infect every single honeypot on these networks. Although it is
more than three years since the worm’s initial release and security patches
to remove the exploited vulnerability have been available for a long time,
more than 1.000 distinct source addresses have tried to infect the honeypots
during the seven days of the experiment.
The Set32 signature is the third most frequently generated signature type
on the NTNU network. There are no signatures of this type generated by
HoneyComb on the Uninett network. This signature type resembles the
Msreg signature described above. It is based on messenger spam traffic that
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causes pop-up alerts and warns the user that Windows has found critical
system errors. The user is urged to visit a web site, http://www.set32.com,
to download software and thereby fix these errors. This software is likely to
install spyware or backdoors on the system.
The packets that cause the Set32 signatures generate no alerts in Snort. As
with Msreg, human interaction is needed for the host to be infected and it
is therefore not characterized as a worm in this thesis.
The Cka signature is among the top five most frequently generated signature
types on both subnetworks. It is based on packets received on UDP port 137
utilizing the NetBios NameService protocol. Although these packets do not
trigger any alerts in Snort, there is a strong indication that these packets
are in fact parts of possible attacks. The single packet that generates this
signature has been identified as identical to the first packet in a series of
packets contained in the exploit [myN] used by the Newbiero worm [56].
This worm utilizes the network file sharing mechanism in Windows to infect
new hosts and install a backdoor.
It is, however, impossible to characterize this signature as the Newbiero
worm with 100 % certainty since the rest of the exploit is lacking in the
traffic trace. The reason for this is believed to be the lack of interaction
offered by Honeyd. Getting no response from the first Netbios request would
probably cause the worm to reject the specific host as a potential victim and
continue to search for new hosts. A working Netbios script for Honeyd could
have helped to clarify whether or not these signatures were actually caused
by the Newbiero worm.
HoneyComb has generated a considerable amount of the Webdav signature
on both the NTNU and Uninett network (this is the seventh most frequently
generated signature type on the NTNU network). The reason for the large
amount of these signatures seems to be that the payload of these packets
contains the IP destination address (i.e., the IP addresses of the honeypots).
This causes a large amount of specific signatures being generated by Hon-
eyComb in this experiment. The packets tend to arrive in chunks with only
one packet destined to each attacked honeypot in each chunk. As the time
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between chunks generally is quite long, it is likely that running HoneyComb
with a functional LCS algorithm would have resulted in a smaller set of
general signatures, excluding the connection-specific parts from the content,
instead of the relatively large number of specific signatures generated in this
experiment.
The packets causing the signatures also trigger Snort to generate WEB-IIS
view source via translate header alerts. This indicates an information
gathering attack to get the processing of scripting files (e.g., asp files) on
Microsoft IIS web servers to fail. If successful, the source files rather than
the processed files are returned to the browser [Data]. Most of these kinds of
alerts seem to be generated as a result of some sort of automated attack. The
attacker starts by scanning port 13910 on the entire honeypot range on one
of the subnetworks. This scan is most likely performed to get an overview
of the hosts running Windows. The attack is followed by port scans to
determine if port 80 is open on the honeypots emulating Windows. The
purpose of this is to find out if the host is running a web server. Finally,
these honeypots receive the packets causing the signature in HoneyComb
and alerts in Snort. As these attacks do not seem to make any attempt to
infect the honeypots in any way, it is unlikely that this is worm traffic.
The fifth most frequent type of signature generated on the Uninett network
is the H04. This name was given to the signature due to the repeated byte
pattern 48 04 in the payload11.
Snort generated three different alerts when receiving this signature type:
WEB-MISC WebDAV search access12, OVERSIZE REQUEST-URI DIRECTORY and
BARE BYTE UNICODE ENCODING, depending on the actual packet payload.
It is unlikely that these signatures are generated based on worm activity as
all the above mentioned alerts are generated by no more than two distinct
source IP addresses. In addition, the WEB-MISC WebDAV search access
alert is generated when an attacker tries to get a complete directory listing
of a web server, a kind of reconnaissance attack [Datb]. This reconnaissance
10Port 139 is a port used by NetBIOS in Windows to enable file and printer sharing.
11The byte 48 is a hex representation of the letter H.
12This alert is not related to the Webdav signature presented above.
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could be a prelude to a more serious attack, but it is improbable that a worm
would do any preliminary work like this before actually trying to infect a
new host.
The Lookfreebies signature is the fifth most frequent signature type gen-
erated on the NTNU network. The packets causing this signature type
generate no alert in Snort as their payload instruction is seemingly harm-
less. The packets are probably meant for proxy servers, since the pay-
load instructs the recipient of the packet to fetch the php file located at
http://lookfreebies.com/prx1.php. This php file will upon retrieval gen-
erate a report of certain properties of the machine getting the packet, possi-
bly information that spammers can use to find out if the proxy can be used
for spam forwarding.
In addition to the most frequently generated signature types on the two
subnetworks, two other signature types that have been generated during the
experiment are worth mentioning.
HoneyComb has generated 18 unique Dos signatures on the Uninett network
on day 4. This signature is based on 8 uploaded binary files using a backdoor
created by the Mydoom worm that is emulated by the honeypots. As the
files were copied to another machine for analysis, anti-virus software (Nor-
ton AntiVirus 2005 version 11.0.11.4) identified the files as the Doomjuice
worm [Sym04b]. Like some of the Mydoom versions, Doomjuice will also
perform a DoS attack against http://www.microsoft.com.
While analyzing these signatures, it was discovered that another worm prop-
agating through backdoors created by Mydoom, the Gobot.A [Sym04a], had
also been uploaded to one of the honeypots this day. However, because only
one instance of the worm was uploaded to the honeypots, HoneyComb cre-
ated no signature for this worm.
The Tftp signature type is generated after several attempts to download
what seems to be the payload of the Dabber worm – packet.exe. The
Dabber worm is characteristic in the way that it propagates by utilizing a
vulnerability in the Sasser worm implementation, not a backdoor left by the
Sasser worm itself [Gro04]. An examination of the traffic dumps shows that
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packets destined to port 5554 are sent to the honeypots prior to the actual
instruction to download the packet.exe file. This coincides with Dabber’s
reported behavior, as it searches for Sasser infected hosts on port 555413
before actually launching its own attack. Only 15 signatures of this kind
were generated during the entire experiment, indicating that the worm is
not particularly active. The worm has also been reported to propagate at a
very low rate since it is depending on the new victim to already be infected
by the Sasser worm.
Is the amount of false positives at an acceptable level?
The signature types generated by HoneyComb on the two subnetworks were
combined and categorized according to the function of the corresponding
packets. This categorization is depicted in Figure 5.1014. As shown in the
figure, only 10 % of the generated signatures are confirmed to be caused by
actual worms. Thus, there is a significant amount of false positives generated
by HoneyComb during this experiment. The messenger spam signatures,
Msreg and Set32, are the main reason for this, comprising approximately
82 % of the total amount of signatures.
Several factors are believed to have contributed to this high portion of false
positives. The first, and maybe the most important, is the non-functional
LCS algorithm used by HoneyComb. Since no payload pattern match is
required to generate a new signature, a large amount of signatures that
never would have been created with a working LCS implementation have
been generated. Second, when using a pattern-matching technique to detect
worms, an assumption that worms send multiple similar packets to many
destination addresses is made. Although this is often the case, it is also
the case for other applications and other types of attacks. Thus, a certain
number of false positives will always be generated by a pattern-matching
detection system that aims at detecting unknown worms. It is possible to
adjust the minimum pattern length that is required for the tool to generate
a new signature to make the number of false positives decrease. By doing so,
13Sasser creates a backdoor on port 5554 on each infected machine.
14The data behind this figure is presented in Appendix H.2
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however, the number of false negatives can increase, as worms with invariants
smaller than the minimum pattern length will manage to evade detection.
Third, the alteration of the HoneyComb source code, as described in 5.2,
may also have increased the number of false positives as signatures can be
generated based on the first packet in a ”UDP connection”.
Figure 5.10: Categorization of unique signature types.
Ratio of incoming alerts and packets
Figure 5.1115 shows a comparison of the total number of incoming packets
and the total number of alerts generated by these packets.
Assuming that the relation between packets and alerts is injective16, about
14 % of all the incoming packets are classified as a potential attack by Snort.
This is, however, a rather crude estimate due to Snort’s behavior:
15The data behind this figure is presented in Appendix H.3
16A relation is said to be injective if there is a one-to-one mapping between the enti-
ties [57]. The relation between packets and alerts is injective if all alerts are based on only
one packet, and all incoming packets can generate only one single alert.
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Figure 5.11: Inbound traffic compared to inbound Snort IDS alerts.
• One incoming packet can make Snort generate several alerts (e.g., the
Slammer worm generates two distinct alerts).
• Snort can generate one alert based on several incoming packets (e.g.,
port scan attacks).
5.7 Data Uncertainties
In addition to the erroneous implementation of the LCS algorithm in Hon-
eyComb, other conditions that affect the quality of the dataset may exist.
The data uncertainties in the experiments described in this thesis are listed
below:
• Unreported errors or weaknesses in some of the software tools used in
the experiments may have affected the data being collected.
• Undiscovered errors made in the configuration of the software tools
may have had an influence on the captured data.
• The live traffic experiment is conducted over a fairly short period of
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time. Longer experiments could be conducted to confirm or modify
the results presented in this thesis.
• HoneyComb lost all its knowledge of previously received connections
periodically since it had to be restarted every 24 hours to avoid crash-
ing. If one instance of a certain type of malicious packet was received
by the honeypots just before one of the restarts, and the next instance
was received just after, the malicious traffic could have evaded detec-
tion as HoneyComb must receive two packets destined to the same
destination port before it generates a new signature.
• All traffic to the Uninett network had to be forwarded to the NTNU
network to reach the honeypots. Since this is visible for an attacker
using traceroute, it may have led to suspicion and possibly finger-
printing of the honeypots.
• If the honeypots have been fingerprinted they may have been subjected
to data poisoning by the blackhat community.
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Chapter 6
An Architecture for
Detection of Unknown
Worms
In this chapter, a worm detection system architecture aimed at detecting
unknown worms is proposed. The system design is based on ideas from
Sweetbait [43, 44] and HoneyStat [45], as well as experiences from the ex-
periments conducted in this project. Contributions in this chapter are the
Known-Attack (KA) filter, described in 6.2.3, and the signature categoriza-
tion scheme outlined in 6.2.6.
6.1 System Properties
Prior to the presentation of the detailed system design, it is necessary to
clarify some key properties of the worm detection system.
6.1.1 Sensor Positioning
One of the first aspects to consider is where to place the sensors. Should
they be placed in the backbone network to monitor all traffic or should they
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be distributed in the local networks?
A sensor placed in the backbone network would have to be a packet snif-
fer, as its task is to monitor all packets being transmitted, regardless of
the destination IP address. This sensor positioning has several potential
advantages:
• The delay between a worm outbreak and detection in such a system
is minimal, as every packet from one network to another has to go
through these network elements.
• The detection mechanism is transparent to any local network, provid-
ing scalability and ease of deployment.
Although this approach is promising, the high traffic load of the backbone
network makes it difficult to analyze packet payload in real-time. Wagner et
al. [58] have proposed an entropy-based worm and anomaly detection scheme
that can be used in large bandwidth IP networks. This system is, however,
only able to provide early warnings of worm outbreaks based on changes
in the network activity, and must therefore rely on other mechanisms to
actually detect and identify worms.
When the detection sensors are placed in the local networks, the traffic load
experienced is minimal compared to the backbone approach. Thus, payload
examination and worm detection in local networks is feasible and is used
in the architecture proposed in this chapter. The detection sensors used
in such a system can be either network elements, honeypots, or host-based
sensors, as will be further discussed in 6.1.2.
In a local network, an inter-domain signature distribution mechanism is
needed as part of the detection system. By globally distributing newly gen-
erated worm signatures through, e.g., a global signature repository, networks
in other domains can be warned about global worm outbreaks and thereby be
able to block a worm even before it has reached the domain. To accomplish
immunization against rapidly spreading worms, this signature distribution
mechanism has to be a fully automated process. To avoid false alarms in
such a scheme, several precautions must be taken. First, every sensor has
80
6.1 System Properties
to be authenticated before uploading new signatures to the global reposi-
tory and the communication channels must be secure. Second, a signature
should be received by a certain number of distinct sensors before it can be
considered a valid signature. Without precautions like these, people with
malicious intent may create false signatures to block certain network ser-
vices (i.e., denial-of-service), and signatures based on false positives in one
network may spread globally.
6.1.2 Sensor Type
Following the decision to place the sensors in the local network, the next
question is what type of sensor to use in the local network. Three types of
sensors are presented here.
Network filtering elements
One possibility is to use ingress and egress filtering in the local network.
These filters are located on gateways or border routers of the local net-
work, monitoring all the traffic arriving at and leaving the network, respec-
tively [50]. These filters have the advantage that they can inspect all traffic
entering or exiting the local network in which they are deployed. Hence, it
is possible to detect hitlist worms directed towards any of the hosts inside
the local network, but as the filtering technique is signature-based, it may
be difficult to detect polymorphic worms.
There is also a trade-off between the filtering granularity and the resource
usage. Extensive payload inspection may lead to resource exhaustion as it
is likely that the filters will observe a significant amount of traffic. As a
result, most current network filter elements does not inspect the payload of
the observed traffic, but is rather based on packet header analysis [49].
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Host-based sensors
Another type of sensors is the host-based detection sensors. Examples of this
type are PAYL, which was briefly presented in 4.1.3, and StackGuard1 [59].
One advantage with host-based sensors is the fact that they can be used
to protect the production network directly. Hence, it is possible to detect
hitlist worms directed towards a particular host or set of hosts. Evidently,
the sensors would have to be installed and configured on several hosts which
could be impractical. Another potential obstacle is the need for additional
use of resources on a host that may already be heavily burdened.
Honeypots
A third sensor type is honeypots. As already stated in 2.3, the use of hon-
eypots can result in a more comprehensible data set as they should receive
no legitimate traffic. This also yields lower resource demands compared to
the other sensor types.
A potential drawback with the use of honeypots is their narrow view, as they
can only observe traffic bound for themselves. In general, this introduces a
delay regarding the detection time of worm outbreaks. This problem can, to
a certain degree, be compensated by deploying a large set of distributed hon-
eypots to increase the collective view of the honeypot network. A centralized
processing unit can be used to correlate the data collected by these honey-
pots. As outlined in 2.4, this is one of the goals of the Honeynet Project.
However, traffic sent to other, non-honeypot hosts cannot be observed with
the use of honeypots. Honeypots are therefore not suited to detect hitlist
worms2.
One particular worm characteristic favors the honeypot technique when it
comes to detecting worms. As described in 3.1.1, many worms utilize a
random scanning technique in order to find new victims. By deploying hon-
1StackGuard is a program that monitors the computer stack to detect and prevent
buffer overflow attacks, a type of attack often utilized by worms.
2A system incorporating so-called ”shadow honeypots”, as decribed in 4.1.3, may be
able to detect hitlist worms.
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eypots, scans that are directed towards unused IP addresses can be detected.
This may provide an early warning alert, and the worm payload can even
be downloaded for further investigation.
As outlined in 2.2, there is a trade-off between the level of interaction of-
fered by the honeypot to the attacker and the amount of information that
can be collected from the attack. It may be argued that there is no need
for a high level of interaction because most worms are not particularly intel-
ligent. When it comes to detecting unknown worms, though, script-driven
low-interaction honeypots may be inadequate. In order to detect an un-
known worm, the vulnerability that the worm tries to exploit has to be
available on the target machine (i.e., the honeypot). For a low-interaction
honeypot, this means that a script emulating that particular vulnerability
is needed. Even though some worms exploit known vulnerabilities, it seems
likely that a script emulating a certain vulnerability is written as a result
of a global worm outbreak, not in advance. In addition, some worms may
exploit unknown vulnerabilities which make the availability of a suitable
script, and thereby possible detection even more unlikely. Hence, it is neces-
sary to provide a set of full-blown services (i.e., high-interaction honeypots)
for the worms to interact with. To minimize the possibility that the high-
interaction honeypots are compromised and used to attack other systems, a
controlled environment should be used.
6.1.3 Detection Strategies
The honeypot detection systems studied in this thesis uses one of two dif-
ferent detection techniques. The first is to search for patterns in the packet
stream, comparing each incoming packet with already received ones. This
is the technique used by HoneyComb, as described in 4.1.1. The second ap-
proach is to define various events (e.g., memory or disk events) and detect
worms based on correlation of the events triggered by traffic from differ-
ent sources. HoneyStat, which was described in 4.1.2, utilizes this tech-
nique. Although these systems detect worms in two different ways, the
actual signature generation mechanism in both approaches is similar. While
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the pattern-matching technique searches for the longest common substring
in incoming packets, the event-based technique only compares the packets
that have generated the same sequence of alerts.
The pattern-matching technique is based on the fact that most worms scan
the Internet at random for vulnerable hosts, generating a large amount of
similar packets to many distinct destinations. Although this is true for most
worms seen so far, it may not be the case with future worms such as stealthy
worms that propagate at a very low rate or polymorphic worms that modify
their payload at each propagation attempt. An event-based approach may
be better suited to detect these kinds of worms3. As opposed to pattern-
matching, this technique detects worms based on the behavior of the worm,
not the byte pattern in the payload.
When using pattern-matching techniques it is possible to reduce the po-
tential amount of false positives by adjusting the minimal pattern length
required to achieve matches between packets. However, there is a trade-off
between generating few false positives and detecting worms with small in-
variants. Event-based techniques should not generate false positives based
on similar packet payloads. Although false positives can be generated due
to normal network traffic being misidentified as the source of the reported
events, most false positives generated when using such a technique are caused
by several attackers utilizing the same automated attack tool. Generating
alerts and signatures for these attacks may, however, be justified as these
attacks can be just as damaging as any worm [45].
It is important to notice that neither of the two techniques is able to provide
undeniable proof of unknown worm activity. They are, however, by their
respective modes of operation, able to identify packets that are likely to be
part of a worm outbreak.
Considering all the aspects discussed in this section, the best approach for
worm detection using honeypots seems to be the event-based detection tech-
nique. By using this technique, there is a much better chance of detecting
3Although able to detect polymorphic worms, the signatures generated for these worms
may not be sufficient to stop the propagation as the worm may alter its payload prior to
each propagation attempt.
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stealthy and polymorphic worms and at the same time minimizing the num-
ber of false positives.
6.2 Design
The proposed system architecture, which is illustrated in Figure 6.1, consists
of a centrally located control unit as well as several deployments of the local
components distributed in various local networks, similar to the Sweetbait
architecture [43, 44], to reduce the time delay associated with detecting
an outbreak of a new worm. The remainder of this section describes the
function of the components in Figure 6.1. In addition, due to its significant
role in the architecture, the signature update mechanism will be presented
in detail in 6.2.6.
6.2.1 Honeypots
The detection sensors in this system are, as argued in 6.1, event-based high-
interaction honeypots. To be able to detect as many worm propagation
attempts as possible, these honeypots must cover a large IP address space.
Several actions are taken to achieve this. First, the honeypots are multi-
homed, which means that they are all assigned several distinct IP addresses.
Second, all the honeypots are run as virtual machines in VMWare. This
decreases the need for physical computers significantly, as a large number4
of virtual honeypots can be hosted by one single physical machine. Running
the honeypots as virtual machines will also provide ease of deployment, as
the honeypot installation process need only be performed once5, as well as
increased security since VMWare provides a controlled environment. To re-
duce the risk that the machines hosting VMWare are compromised, these
machines should not run any remotely accessible services beyond the hon-
eypots.
4The number of virtual honeypots that can be run on one host is depending on the
specifications of the host (e.g., memory, processing unit and disk space available).
5The virtual honeypot machine can be stored in a file and transferred to other hosts
for deployment.
85
An Architecture for Detection of Unknown Worms
Figure 6.1: Proposed worm detection system architecture.
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The event-based worm detection approach is based on the method used
by [45]. This method relies on a typical worm infection process, which is
comprised of memory events, disk events and network events. A buffer over-
flow protection mechanism, like StackGuard [59], should be used to monitor
the memory and create events in case of overflow attempts. A disk moni-
toring mechanism, like Kqueue [60], that checks for disk writings to specific
parts of the hard drive, such as the registry or the windows/system32 folder,
should be used to create disk events. Outgoing traffic initiated by the honey-
pot themselves (such as UDP traffic or TCP packets with the SYN flag set)
indicates that they are being used to initiate outgoing attacks, and should
thus generate network events.
During each event the following data is recorded:
• The type of event – along with all relevant, captured data such as stack
state for memory events, outgoing packet payload for network events
and information about file changes for disk events.
• The operating system used on the honeypot, as well as the patch level.
• A trace file of network activity prior to the event.
Since the main focus of this system is to detect and create signatures for
unknown worms, the need for further interaction with the infecting host is
unnecessary when sufficient information about the attack has been recorded.
While it is believed that a memory event, such as a buffer overflow, often
is followed by other interesting events, an outgoing packet from the infected
host (network event) indicates that the honeypot is either downloading the
actual worm payload or have started scanning for new hosts to infect. At
this point, it is therefore assumed that enough data has been recorded to
enable a successful signature generation, and the virtual honeypot is imme-
diately reset6 [45]. Before the honeypot is reset, all events that have been
generated on the honeypot are transferred to the Local Control Unit (LCU)
for processing and signature generation. To ensure that no attacker can
forge messages to the LCU to create invalid signatures, authentication and
message encryption are required.
6This is also done to protect the system from unintentionally attacking other systems.
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A final property of the honeypots is their ability to restart to support a
different set of services and even a different operating system. This is done
upon requests by the LCU to increase the chance of a given worm infecting
the honeypots.
6.2.2 Local Control Unit
Some network administrators may not be willing to add the entire detection
architecture in their network (e.g., due to lack of resources), but are still
interested in protecting their production network against unknown worms.
Due to this, it should be possible to incorporate a simplified version of the
LCU that is only able to receive signature updates from the Global Control
Unit (GCU) and use these in a NIPS to protect the production network.
Evidently, these networks do not need the analysis part of LCU, nor the KA
filter or the set of honeypots.
The remainder of this section presents the LCU as it should be used in a
local network employing the entire worm detection mechanism.
Analysis Unit
The Analysis Unit’s (AU) main task is to correlate the incoming honeypot
events and create signatures for possible worms. When receiving new events
from a honeypot, the following procedure is executed:
Step 1 The incoming events are stored in the log database and correlated
with older events. If a similar chain of events has been received a
certain number of times before, it is assumed that the events are caused
by a worm and step 2 is carried out. If not, the events are simply stored
and the AU returns to idle state.
Step 2 The network packets causing the same chain of events are compared.
If a common substring (larger than a given threshold) is found between
these traffic traces, a signature is created.
Step 3 Before storing the newly generated signature in the database, it is
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compared with the already existing ones. It can then either be stored
directly in the database as a new entry or help to improve one of
the older ones. The signature is also categorized, as will be further
elaborated in 6.2.6.
Communication Unit
The Communication Unit’s (CU) main purpose is to exchange signatures
with the GCU as well as issuing signature updates to the KA filter and
NIPS. Updates are pushed from the CU to the local KA filter and NIPS
every time a new signature is generated or improved. The KA filter and
NIPS will in turn report the activity levels of each signature on a regular
basis.
As in [43, 44], signatures are exchanged periodically between the local and
global units. CU will receive signature updates from the GCU, and will also
send signatures that have been frequently reported in the local network to
the GCU, as further explained in 6.2.6. All communication to and from the
CU must be authenticated and encrypted to ensure that only authorized
signature updates are accepted.
Databases
The signature database is used to store locally generated as well as received
signatures. The log database is used to store the logged events along with
relevant data.
6.2.3 Known-Attack Filter
The main purpose of the KA filter is to look for known attacks (based
on the signatures received from the LCU) in the traffic directed towards
the honeypots. Inbound filtering is used to minimize the amount of data
needed to be processed by the honeypots. The reasons for this are the
significant processing overhead reported in some worm detection systems
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(e.g., HoneyComb) and the desire to deploy as many virtual honeypots as
possible with the available resources (e.g., HoneyStat). Because the goal of
the system is to detect unknown worms, there is no reason why the honeypots
should have to process any traffic where the outcome is already known.
This functionality has, to the knowledge of the authors, never before been
incorporated in a worm detection system.
The live traffic experiment conducted in this project showed that approxi-
mately 14 % of the incoming packets triggered alerts in Snort. Although this
may not seem like a significant part, it is likely that the packets triggering
alerts are quite resource demanding – especially for an event-based detection
system, as used in the proposed architecture. In addition, the percentage
share of packets being removed by the KA filter is likely to increase as the
filter is updated with newly generated signatures.
Even though the honeypots are restarted following a network event, there is
a risk that an advanced blackhat is able to escape the controlled environment
in VMWare and thereby gain control of one of the machines hosting virtual
honeypots. To minimize the effect in such a case, the KA filter should also
be able to perform outbound filtering by blocking known attacks and deny
any outbound connection establishment attempts, similar to the Honeywall7
in the Honeynet Project’s honeynet architecture [61, 62]. One might think
that by denying the honeypots to establish any outbound connections, the
possibility to download the worm payload for further analysis for worms
utilizing a second channel as a propagation carrier, as discussed in 3.1.2,
is lost. However, for the newly infected host to be able to know where to
download the payload, it has to receive information regarding the location
of the payload during the infection. That is, at the time when the infected
honeypot attempts to establish a connection to download the worm payload,
the information collected is already sufficient to download the payload at a
later stage, either automatically by the LCU or manually by a forensics team.
Thus, the blocking of the outbound connection attempt is appropriate.
7The KA filter is placed on the Data Link Layer, similar to the Honeywall, to avoid
decrementing the TTL field in the IP header, and thereby reducing the chance of being
fingerprinted.
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In addition to the filtering mechanism, the KA filter receives signature up-
dates from the LCU and is capable of reporting the activity level of these
signatures to the LCU.
6.2.4 Network Intrusion Prevention System
The NIPS is placed in the system to protect the production network. It
can filter traffic that is unwanted based on certain ports as specified by the
network administrator, as well as traffic that have been declared malicious
as a result of signature updates from the LCU. Similar to the KA filter, it
is also possible for the NIPS to report back to the LCU on the activity level
of the received signatures.
6.2.5 Global Control Unit
The GCU serves as a central signature storage and distribution unit. It
receives signature updates from the distributed LCUs and is able to corre-
late received data from different locations to compose improved signatures.
Based on the received data, it issues periodic updates to the LCUs. As
the GCU is a potential single point-of-failure and the effects can be catas-
trophic if it is compromised, the requirements regarding security are strict.
All communication between the GCU and LCUs should be authenticated
and encrypted in order to avoid forged signature updates.
6.2.6 Signature Updates
To avoid flooding the GCU with new signatures each time a signature is
generated in the local network, a signature categorization, as depicted below,
is introduced.
Category 1 Received from the GCU
Category 2 Several instances reported locally
Category 3 A few instances (up to a certain threshold) reported locally
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Category 4 No longer active (on a global basis)
Newly generated signatures are tagged as Category 3 by the AU, as they
have not been seen more than once in the local network. Signatures that
are improved upon the reception of new events are marked as Category 2.
This is also the case for Category 3 signatures that are reported frequently
by the KA filter and NIPS in the local network. These signatures will be
reported to the GCU when the next signature update is sent.
The signatures received by the GCU are labeled Category 1. The fact that
these signatures have been reported by the GCU indicates that the worms
they identify have been frequently detected by several LCUs. The local
activity levels of these Category 1 signatures are reported back to the GCU
in each signature update. If one of these signatures is rarely reported as
active, the GCU will mark it as Category 4 in the next signature update.
This informs the LCUs that the worm identified by this signature is no
longer active on a global basis. However, if this worm is active in the local
network, the LCU is still able to issue the signature to the NIPS to protect
the local production systems.
6.3 Discussion
As already argued in the previous sections, the proposed worm detection
system architecture has several advantageous properties. It is, however,
equally important to identify potential limitations of this architecture.
6.3.1 Security Risks
The fact that the detection sensors used in this architecture are high-interaction
honeypots makes it possible for a blackhat to assume total control of one
or several of them. Further, it may be possible for an advanced blackhat to
escape the virtual machine hosted by VMWare, and thereby gain control of
the honeypot host. Although the outbound filtering performed by the KA
filter should block known, malicious packets and stop any attempts to set up
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connections, the worm detection system can be disabled if all the honeypot
hosts have been compromised. Thus, there may be a need for regular human
supervision to ensure that this has not happened.
6.3.2 Fingerprinting
As described in 6.2.1, the honeypots are reset upon each generated network
event, the purpose being to minimize the risk of outgoing attacks. This
behavior is characteristic for the system, and may increase the chance that
the architecture is fingerprinted by blackhats. It may also be possible to
fingerprint the architecture based on the behavior of VMWare, as discussed
in [45].
The introduction of the KA filter may increase the risk of the system being
fingerprinted. A blackhat may become suspicious when experiencing that
unreported exploits may only work a couple of times before being blocked.
The outbound filtering may also increase the chance of the system being
fingerprinted. However, since the filter does not decrement the TTL field in
the IP header, it is difficult for a blackhat to determine if attacks are dropped
by a KA filter or by other network filtering elements in the transmission path.
It may be argued that fingerprinting have no affect on the system’s ability to
detect worms since most worms scan for vulnerable hosts at random. How-
ever, future worms may incorporate a non-hitlist that explicitly instructs
the worm which hosts not to infect.
It is possible to decrease the risk of being fingerprinted at the expense of
increasing the blackhats’ possibilities to do damage. This would result in a
need for an even more extensive supervision of the honeypot system.
6.3.3 Single Point-of-Failure
As in all centrally connected architectures, there is a potential single point-
of-failure. If the GCU is exposed to some kind of attack, the consequences
could be severe. In case of a DoS attack against the GCU, it would be
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impossible for the LCUs to exchange signatures with each other. However,
the local networks incorporating the entire worm detection functionality8
are still able to protect their production networks as soon as the signature
has been generated locally. It is possible to reduce the consequences of a
GCU being attacked by keeping GCU replicas distributed in the network.
If the GCU is compromised, the attacker could spread false signatures and
even mark legitimate signatures as Category 4 (no longer active). To mini-
mize the chance of this, the GCU should be placed in a highly secure location
and should accept no traffic except the authenticated and encrypted sessions
with the LCUs.
8As argued in 6.2.2, it should be possible to receive the signature updates from the GCU
without incorporating the worm detection mechanism in the local network. These local
networks will not be able to protect their production network against unknown worms in
case of a DoS attack directed towards the GCU.
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Conclusions
One goal of this project was to study existing worm propagation models and
conduct simulations using these to model the spreading of computer worms.
The Code Red I v2 worm was simulated using three existing models, and
the results were compared to data collected from the actual worm outbreak.
The results showed that the propagation of a worm can be quite accurately
described by such worm propagation models. However, the simulations also
concluded that the results are not only based on the propagation model
used, but also rely heavily on the values of the model parameters. As of yet,
the process of accurately determining these parameters cannot be carried
out prior to a worm outbreak.
The honeypot setup installed at NTNU was extended to incorporate the
pattern-matching worm detection mechanism HoneyComb. The existing
source code was altered to compensate a limitation discovered in the way
HoneyComb treats UDP packets, and two short as well as one longer exper-
iment were conducted. The overall goal of the experiments was to evaluate
the effectiveness and reliability of this worm detection mechanism.
The nonfunctional LCS algorithm discovered in the polymorphic payload
experiment has affected HoneyComb’s ability to generate correct signatures.
The consequences are thoroughly described and considered during the data
analysis. It is, however, difficult to accurately quantify the actual influence
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of the non-functional LCS algorithm on the experimental results.
The experiments showed that honeypots can be used to detect network
worms. During the experiment on the two unfiltered subnetworks, Honey-
Comb generated signatures for the Slammer, Doomjuice, and Dabber worm.
At the same time, there seemed to be a large amount of false positives among
the generated signatures. Only 10 % of the unique signatures generated are
based on traffic identified as worm traffic. It is likely that the troubles with
HoneyComb may have been a contributing factor to the large number of
false positives.
Based on the study of existing worm detection systems and the experiences
from the experiments conducted in this project, a system architecture for
detection of unknown worms is proposed. The architecture is based on a
combination of the existing worm detection architectures Sweetbait [43, 44]
and HoneyStat [45].
The proposed architecture introduces the use of a Known-Attack (KA) fil-
ter. The main purpose of this filter is to remove known attacks from the
traffic directed towards the honeypots in order to reduce the amount of traf-
fic needed to be processed by the honeypot sensors. The data from the
live traffic experiment conducted in this project showed that 14 % of the
inbound traffic triggered alerts in Snort. It is, however, likely that the KA
filter is able to remove a considerably larger amount of the traffic as it re-
ceives continuous updates from the Local Control Unit (LCU) with newly
generated signatures. In addition, the KA filter is able to perform outbound
filtering to reduce the chance that the honeypots are being used to attack
other systems, as well as to report the activity level of the signatures to the
LCU.
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Further Work
In this chapter, some suggestions to further work regarding worm detection
using honeypots are given.
• The experiments in this thesis should be conducted with an improved
version of HoneyComb. The results of these experiments could be
compared to the results presented in this thesis. Following a more
stable version of Flowreplay, it is even possible to replay the traffic
dumps captured during the experiments of this project.
• Longer experiments could be conducted with an improved version of
Honeycomb in order to provide a better statistical foundation to base
the conclusions upon.
• Further studies on the proposed worm detection architecture could be
carried out. Possible objectives of such a project could be to create a
proof-of-concept followed by experiments and a possible implementa-
tion of the entire architecture.
• A project aimed at further development of existing worm propagation
models could be carried out. An objective could be to accurately
determine the parameters used in these models in order to achieve
more realistic simulations.
• A project devoted to detecting weaknesses in widely used honeypots
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systems, e.g., by attempting to fingerprint existing honeypot solutions,
could be carried out. This may help reveal weaknesses and the need
for improvements of the honeypot technology.
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Appendix A
Guidelines for use of the
Honeypots
Before deploying a honeypot, it is important to thoroughly consider the
design of the honeypot system. If the system is implemented and configured
incorrectly, it could potentially be used to severely damage other systems.
In addition to evaluating the honeypot design prior to deployment, maintain-
ing the honeypot is equally important in order to achieve its full potential.
Honeypot maintenance includes the use of alert mechanisms and response
policies. In addition, keeping the honeypot updated is essential [9].
The guidelines developed here will be used as a reference throughout this
project in order to minimize the risk that the honeypots are exploited by
a blackhat. These guidelines are extensions of the guidelines originally de-
veloped by Christian Larsen in his master’s thesis [5] and further developed
in [6].
A.1 Implementation
After deciding the purpose of the honeypot, it is essential to choose an ap-
propriate interaction level. The larger the level of interaction, the greater
the possibility to capture useful information from an attack. However, the
increased level of interaction leads to increased complexity, and thereby in-
creased risk. Hence, the lowest interaction level that satisfies the purpose of
the honeypot should be chosen.
To help minimize complexity, a marginal kernel and set of services should
be installed and run on the honeypot system.
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For research honeypots, which are used in this project, it is vital that the
system is not used to attack other non-honeypot systems. A low-interaction
honeypot cannot be captured and used by a blackhat to launch attacks
against other systems. This is ensured by the use of a firewall with a default
drop policy.
Another essential area of a research honeypot is the data capture. The
honeypot should generally be configured to capture as much information as
possible. Even though information may not seem useful at the time, it may
be of importance later when the analysis is to be performed. Redundancy
should be used in data capturing in case one or several of the mechanisms
are unable to capture the information. Traffic dumps, various alerts and
service logs are examples of captured information [9].
A.2 Maintenance
A.2.1 Supervision and Alert Mechanisms
An important part of the supervision is the use of alert mechanisms. An
alert is reported when traffic that is believed to be malicious is observed by
the alert mechanisms. However, because alert mechanisms cannot be trusted
to detect all possible attacks, there may be a need for human supervision.
The level of supervision required in addition to alert mechanisms is largely
determined by the interaction level of the honeypot. All the honeypots used
in this project are low-interaction.
A low-interaction system can run unsupervised, but the alerts and host
system logs should be inspected at least every day to check for attempted
attacks against the hosts or sensors, or data poisoning.
A.2.2 Reaction Policy
According to Spitzner, it is important to define the reaction policy in advance
of an attack to be able to react quickly and properly [9].
The honeypots used in this project are research honeypots. The objective
with these honeypots is to passively monitor the attack in order to learn as
much as possible about the attacker’s behavior. To minimize the risk that a
honeypot is used by a blackhat to attack other non-honeypot systems, the
following responses should be carried out by the honeypot supervisor:
• If the honeypot supervisor looses track of what the blackhat, who has
obtained control of the system, is doing (e.g., he suspects that he may
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deal with a sophisticated blackhat with skills that possibly exceed
those of his own) he should shut down the honeypot by physically
disconnecting the network cable.
• If a honeypot is successfully used to attack a non-honeypot system,
the honeypot should be locked down, and the design should be care-
fully re-evaluated and the project supervisor as well as the network
administrators should be informed before redeploying the honeypot.
A.2.3 Updates
The project members should assure that the honeypots are kept updated
with respect to relevant security patches during the project.
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Appendix B
Code Red I v2 Simulations
B.1 Simulations Using the SI Model
% [t,y] = si(S, I, t_max, eta, time)
%
% Uses the simple epidemiological model to model
% the spread of a worm on a network.
%
% S: Initial number of vulnerable machines
% I: Initial number of infected machines
% t_max: Time (in seconds) that the simulation should go to
% eta: Scans per second per infected computer
% time: When 0, the time axis on the plot is in seconds, when
% 1 it is in minutes, and when 2 it is in hours
function y = si(S, I, t_max, eta, time)
t_div = 20; % Number of slices a second will be divided into
beta = eta/2^32; % Chance a scan is effective (IPv4)
beta_ = beta/t_div; % Scans per time division
tspan = [1/t_div t_max*t_div]; % Basic time unit is 1/t_div
% seconds
ic = [I S];
options = [];
[t,y] = ode23s(@ODEFUN, tspan, ic, options, beta_);
% Plot the results
figure;
if time == 0
t2 = t/t_div;
elseif time == 1
t2 = t/t_div/60;
elseif time == 2
t2 = t/t_div/3600;
end
l = ones(length(t), 1)*0.98*(S+I);
plot(t2, l, ’:k’, t2, y(:,1), ’-k’, t2, y(:,2), ’-.k’);
%title(’Worm Spread Under the Simple Epidemic Model’);
if time == 0
111
Code Red I v2 Simulations
xlabel(’time (seconds)’);
elseif time == 1
xlabel(’time (minutes)’);
elseif time == 2
xlabel(’time (hours)’);
end
ylabel(’Population size’);
legend(’98% of total population’, ’Infected’, ’Susceptible’);
% Fty = ODEFUN(t, y, beta)
%
% Calculates the derivatives for the KM model.
function Fty = ODEFUN(t, y, beta)
% Shorthands for variable names
I = y(1);
%R = y(2);
S = y(2);
% Results vector
Fty = zeros(2, 1);
% dI/dt
Fty(1) = beta*I*S;
% dS/dt
Fty(2) = -beta*I*S;
Figure B.1: Worm spread using the SI model.
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B.2 Simulations Using the SIR Model
% [t,y] = km(S, I, t_max, rate, gamma, time)
%
% Uses the Kermack-Mckendric (SIR) epidemiological model to
% model the spread of a worm on a network.
%
% S: Initial number of susceptible machines
% I: Initial number of infected machines
% t_max: Time (in seconds) that the simulation should go to
% eta: Scans per second per infected computer
% 1/gamma: Average time a worm can propagate on a host before
% being removed
% time: When 0, the time axis on the plot is in seconds, when
% 1 it is in minutes, and when 2 it is in hours
function y = km(S, I, t_max, rate, gamma, time)
t_div = 20; % Number of slices a second will be divided into
beta = rate/2^32; % Chance a scan is effective (IPv4)
beta_ = beta/t_div; % Scans per time division
gamma_ = gamma/t_div; % gamma adjusted for step size
R = 0; % There are initially 0 removed hosts
tspan = [1/t_div t_max*t_div]; % Basic time unit is 1/t_div
% seconds
ic = [I R S];
options = [];
[t,y] = ode23s(@ODEFUN, tspan, ic, options, beta_, gamma_);
% Plot the results
figure;
if time == 0
t2 = t/t_div;
elseif time == 1
t2 = t/t_div/60;
elseif time == 2
t2 = t/t_div/3600;
end
l = ones(length(t), 1)*0.98*(S+I);
plot(t2, l, ’:k’, t2, y(:,1), ’-k’, t2, y(:,2), ’-.k’, ...
t2, y(:,3), ’--k’);
if time == 0
xlabel(’time (seconds)’);
elseif time == 1
xlabel(’time (minutes)’);
elseif time == 2
xlabel(’time (hours)’);
end
ylabel(’Population size’);
legend(’98% of total population’, ’Infected’, ’Removed’, ...
’Susceptible’);
% Fty = ODEFUN(t, y, beta, gamma)
%
% Calculates the derivatives for the SIR model.
function Fty = ODEFUN(t, y, beta, gamma)
% Shorthands for variable names
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I = y(1);
R = y(2);
S = y(3);
% Results vector
Fty = zeros(3, 1);
% dI/dt
Fty(1) = beta*I*S - gamma*I;
% dR/dt
Fty(2) = gamma*I;
% dS/ht
Fty(3) = -beta*I*S;
Figure B.2: Worm spread using the SIR model.
B.3 Simulations Using the Two-factor Model
% [t,y] = twofactor(S, I, t_max, rate, gamma, eta, my, time)
%
% Uses the two-factor epidemiological model to model
% the spread of a worm on a network.
%
% S: Initial number of susceptible machines
% I: Initial number of infected machines
114
B.3 Simulations Using the Two-factor Model
% t_max: Time (in seconds) that the simulation should go to
% eta: Scans per second per infected computer
% 1/gamma: Average time a worm can propagate on a host before
% being removed
% time: When 0, the time axis on the plot is in seconds, when
% 1 it is in minutes, and when 2 it is in hours
function y = twofactor(S, I, t_max, rate, gamma, eta, my, time)
t_div = 20; % Number of slices a second will be divided into
b0 = rate/2^32; % Initial chance a scan is effective (IPv4)
b0_ = b0/t_div; % Scans per time division
gamma_ = gamma/t_div; % gamma adjusted for step size
eta_ = eta/t_div; %eta adjusted for step size
my_ = my/t_div; %my adjusted for step size
R = 0; % There are initially 0 removed hosts
Q = 0;% There are initially 0 quarantined hosts
B = b0_;
tspan = [1/t_div t_max*t_div]; % Basic time unit is 1/t_div
% seconds
ic = [I R S Q B];
options = [];
[t,y] = ode23s(@ODEFUN, tspan, ic, options, b0_, gamma_, ...
eta_, my_);
% Plot the results
figure;
if time == 0
t2 = t/t_div;
elseif time == 1
t2 = t/t_div/60;
elseif time == 2
t2 = t/t_div/3600;
end
l = ones(length(t), 1)*0.98*(S+I);
plot(t2, l, ’:k’, t2, y(:,1), ’-k’, t2, y(:,2), ’-.k’, ...
t2, y(:,3), ’--k’, t2, y(:,4), ’-xk’);
if time == 0
xlabel(’time (seconds)’);
elseif time == 1
xlabel(’time (minutes)’);
elseif time == 2
xlabel(’time (hours)’);
end
ylabel(’Population size’);
legend(’98% of total population’, ’Infected’, ’Removed’, ...
’Susceptible’, ’Quarantined’);
% Fty = ODEFUN(t, y, b0_, gamma, eta, my)
%
% Calculates the derivatives for the two-factor model.
function Fty = ODEFUN(t, y, b0, gamma, eta, my)
% Shorthands for variable names
I = y(1);
R = y(2);
S = y(3);
Q = y(4);
B = y(5);
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% Results vector
Fty = zeros(5, 1);
% dI/dt
Fty(1) = B*S*I - gamma*I;
% dR/dt
Fty(2) = gamma*I;
% dS/dt
Fty(3) = -B*I*S - my*S*(I+R);
% dQ/dt
Fty(4) = my*S*(I+R);
% beta derivert
Fty(5) = b0*eta*(1-(I/(I+S+Q+R)))^(eta-1)*((-B*S*I ...
+ gamma*I)/(I+S+R+Q));
Figure B.3: Worm spread using the two-factor model.
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HoneyComb Configuration
The altered HoneyComb source files can be found on the attached DVD.
Follow the following procedure to install the software:
• Make sure Honeyd is installed.
• Make sure the library libstree is installed.
• Install HoneyComb by running configure, make and make install.
• Enter the Honeyd directory, run make clean and then re-install Hon-
eyd using make and make install.
The following HoneyComb configuration was used during the experiments
described in this thesis. Copy this text into the honeyd.conf file located in
the Honeyd directory prior to running Honeyd.
# Honeycomb plugin configuration
#
# Add this to your honeyd configuration file and tweak as you see fit!
# Whether to run the plugin (1) or not (0)
option honeycomb enable 1
# What Snort alert category we use for our signatures
option honeycomb snort_alert_class alert
# The name of the output log file to which we log generated signatures
option honeycomb sig_output_file
/home/dagjonny/honeycomb_logs/honeycomb.log
# How many IP packets we keep in mind and search
# for matching data.
option honeycomb ip_backlog 100
# How many attempted UDP connections we maintain state for at any one time
option honeycomb udp_conns_max 1000
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# How many answered UDP connections we maintain state for at any
# one time. Once a connection is answered, it is moved to a different
# hashtable. We therefore keep state for udp_conns_max attempted
# connections PLUS udp_dataconns_max answered ones.
option honeycomb udp_dataconns_max 1000
# The maximum number of bytes flowing in a single direction without
# any payload coming the other way during the UDP dialog that we
# store. More data going in one direction without any real data
# going the other way is not stored, as we’re currently not looking
# for data there.
#
# This is also the maximum string size the longest common substring
# algorithm in libstree needs to deal with, so we don’t make this
# too high to avoid performance hits.
option honeycomb udp_max_msg_size 5000
# We stop hunting for patterns at some point into a UDP exchange.
# The following defines the number of total bytes inbound before
# we stop caring.
option honeycomb udp_max_bytes 10000
# The minimum pattern length we require before we consider
# a string match in UDP payload meaningful:
option honeycomb udp_pattern_minlen 5
# How many initiated TCP connections we maintain state for at any one time.
option honeycomb tcp_conns_max 65000
# How many established TCP connections we maintain state for at any
# one time. Once a connection is established, it is moved to a different
# hashtable. We therefore keep state for tcp_conns_max unestablished
# connections PLUS tcp_dataconns_max established ones.
option honeycomb tcp_dataconns_max 1000
# The maximum number of bytes flowing in a single direction without
# any payload coming the other way during the TCP dialog that we
# store. More data going in one direction without any real data
# going the other way is not stored, as we’re currently not looking
# for data there.
#
# This is also the maximum string size the longest common substring
# algorithm in libstree needs to deal with, so we don’t make this
# too high to avoid performance hits.
option honeycomb tcp_max_msg_size 5000
# We stop hunting for patterns at some point into a TCP dialogue.
# The following defines the number of total bytes inbound before
# we stop caring.
option honeycomb tcp_max_bytes 10000
# For TCP, we also buffer the incoming payloads in one single buffer
# directly. This defines the size of that buffer.
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option honeycomb tcp_max_buffering_in 1000
# The minimum pattern length we require before we consider
# a string match in TCP payload meaningful:
option honeycomb tcp_pattern_minlen 5
# The number of slots in the hashtables:
option honeycomb conns_hash_slots 199
# The connection hashtables are periodically checked for dead connections
# we’re no longer interested in (this doesn’t automatically mean terminated
# connections, as we need to keep connections around in order to be able to
# have something to compare new ones against!). This setting defines
# the interval in seconds between cleanups.
option honeycomb conns_hash_cleanup_interval 10
# How many generated signatures we keep around before we
# start to forget some.
option honeycomb sighist_max_size 200
# Detected signatures are kept in a history structure and reported
# periodically. This settings defines how long to wait between those
# reports. During the waiting period, existing signatures can be
# improved upon through new traffic flows.
option honeycomb sighist_interval 10
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Appendix D
Altered HoneyComb Source
Code
1 /* This method has been changed to address the limitation of
2 * HoneyComb ’s UDP packet inspection identified in the
3 * thesis
4 */
5
6 static void
7 udp_hook(u_char *packet_data , u_int packet_len ,
8 void *user_data)
9 {
10 HC_Conn *conn;
11 struct ip_hdr *iphdr;
12 struct udp_hdr *udphdr;
13 HC_UDP_CBData cb_data;
14
15 /* Added time in the debug output */
16
17 time_t timer;
18 timer=time(&timer);
19
20 printf("\nUDP -packet: %s\n",asctime(localtime (&timer )));
21 D(("UDP packet inspection --------------------- \n"));
22
23 iphdr = (struct ip_hdr *) packet_data;
24 udphdr = (struct udp_hdr *) (packet_data +
25 (iphdr ->ip_hl << 2));
26
27 memset (&cb_data , 0, sizeof(HC_UDP_CBData ));
28 cb_data.iphdr = iphdr;
29 cb_data.conn = NULL;
30
31 /* Altered the if-statement below such that the full payload
32 * check will be conducted on new UDP "connections" as well.
33 */
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34
35 if (! (conn = hc_udp_conn_find(iphdr ->ip_src ,
36 udphdr ->uh_sport , iphdr ->ip_dst ,
37 udphdr ->uh_dport ))) {
38
39 if (user_data == (void*) HD_OUTGOING)
40 return;
41
42 /* We have a new connection. For the first packet in
43 * a connection we do our header field analysis
44 * consisting of sanity checks and matchings with the
45 * first packets of the other connections we
46 * currently keep state for.
47 */
48
49 hc_udp_conn_foreach (( HC_ConnCB) udp_conn_headercheck_cb ,
50 &cb_data );
51
52 if ( (conn = hc_udp_conn_add(iphdr , udphdr )))
53 hc_udp_conn_update_state(conn , iphdr);
54 } else {
55
56 hc_udp_conn_update_state(conn , iphdr);
57 }
58
59 if (user_data == (void*) HD_OUTGOING)
60 return;
61
62 if (conn ->bytes_seen == 0 &&
63 conn ->bytes_seen_reversed == 0) {
64
65 hc_udp_conn_foreach (( HC_ConnCB) udp_conn_headercheck_cb ,
66 &cb_data );
67
68 } else if (ntohs(udphdr ->uh_ulen) - UDP_HDR_LEN > 0) {
69
70 /* For each current UDP connections , try to find the
71 * corresponding message and analyze:
72 */
73
74 cb_data.conn = conn;
75 cb_data.iphdr = iphdr;
76 hc_udp_conn_foreach (( HC_ConnCB) udp_conn_fullcheck_cb ,
77 &cb_data );
78 }
79 }
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Honeypots Hosted by
Honeyd
NTNU IP Uninett IP Operating System
129.241.196.200 158.38.144.70 win
129.241.196.201 158.38.144.71 win
129.241.196.202 158.38.144.72 linux
129.241.196.203 158.38.144.73 win
129.241.196.204 158.38.144.74 win
129.241.196.205 158.38.144.75 linux
129.241.196.206 158.38.144.76 win
129.241.196.207 158.38.144.77 linux
129.241.196.208 158.38.144.78 linux
129.241.196.209 158.38.144.79 win
129.241.196.210 158.38.144.80 linux
129.241.196.211 158.38.144.81 win
129.241.196.212 158.38.144.82 win
129.241.196.213 158.38.144.83 linux
129.241.196.214 158.38.144.84 win
129.241.196.215 158.38.144.85 win
129.241.196.216 158.38.144.86 linux
129.241.196.217 158.38.144.87 linux
129.241.196.218 158.38.144.88 linux
129.241.196.219 158.38.144.89 linux
129.241.196.220 158.38.144.90 win
129.241.196.221 158.38.144.91 win
129.241.196.222 158.38.144.92 win
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NTNU IP Uninett IP Operating System
129.241.196.223 158.38.144.93 linux
129.241.196.224 158.38.144.94 win
129.241.196.225 158.38.144.95 linux
129.241.196.226 158.38.144.96 linux
129.241.196.227 158.38.144.97 win
129.241.196.228 158.38.144.98 linux
129.241.196.229 158.38.144.99 linux
129.241.196.230 158.38.144.100 win
129.241.196.231 158.38.144.101 linux
129.241.196.232 158.38.144.102 linux
129.241.196.233 158.38.144.103 win
129.241.196.234 158.38.144.104 win
129.241.196.235 158.38.144.105 win
129.241.196.236 158.38.144.106 linux
129.241.196.237 158.38.144.107 win
129.241.196.238 158.38.144.108 linux
129.241.196.239 158.38.144.109 linux
129.241.196.240 158.38.144.110 win
129.241.196.241 158.38.144.111 linux
129.241.196.242 158.38.144.112 linux
129.241.196.243 158.38.144.113 win
129.241.196.244 158.38.144.114 win
129.241.196.245 158.38.144.115 linux
129.241.196.246 158.38.144.116 win
129.241.196.247 158.38.144.117 linux
129.241.196.248 158.38.144.118 linux
129.241.196.249 158.38.144.119 win
129.241.196.250 158.38.144.120 win
129.241.196.251 158.38.144.121 linux
129.241.196.252 158.38.144.122 win
129.241.196.253 158.38.144.123 linux
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HoneyComb Signatures
F.1 Controlled Environment Experiment
F.1.1 Code Red II
alert tcp 129.241.209.110/32 any -> 129.241.196.0/24 80 (msg: "Honeycomb Sun
May 14 13h17m10 2006 "; flags: PA+; flow: established; content: "GET /defaul
t.ida?XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u
9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a HTTP/1.0|0
D 0A|Content-type: text/xml|0A|Content-length: 3379 |0D 0A 0D 0A C8 C8 01 00
|‘|E8 03 00 00 00 CC EB FE|dg|FF|6|00 00|dg|89|&|00 00 E8 DF 02 00 00|h|04 0
1 00 00 8D 85|\|FE FF FF|P|FF|U|9C 8D 85|\|FE FF FF|P|FF|U|98 8B|@|10 8B 08
89 8D|X|FE FF FF FF|U|E4|=|04 04 00 00 0F 94 C1|=|04 08 00 00 0F 94 C5 0A CD
0F B6 C9 89 8D|T|FE FF FF 8B|u|08 81|~0|9A 02 00 00 0F 84 C4 00 00 00 C7|F0|
9A 02 00 00 E8 0A 00 00 00|CodeRedII|00 8B 1C|$|FF|U|D8|f|0B C0 0F 95 85|8|F
E FF FF C7 85|P|FE FF FF 01 00 00 00|j|00 8D 85|P|FE FF FF|P|8D 85|8|FE FF F
F|P|8B|E|08 FF|p|08 FF 90 84 00 00 00 80 BD|8|FE FF FF 01|thS|FF|U|D4 FF|U|E
C 01|E|84|i|BD|T|FE FF FF|,|01 00 00 81 C7|,|01 00 00 E8 D2 04 00 00 F7 D0 0
F AF C7 89|F4|8D|E|88|Pj|00 FF|u|08 E8 05 00 00 00 E9 01 FF FF FF|j|00|j|00
FF|U|F0|P|FF|U|D0|Ou|D2 E8|;|05 00 00|i|BD|T|FE FF FF 00|\&|05 81 C7 00|\&|0
5|W|FF|U|E8|j|00|j|16 FF|U|8C|j|FF FF|U|E8 EB F9 8B|F4)E|84|jd|FF|U|E8 8D 85
|<|FE FF FF|P|FF|U|C0 0F B7 85|<|FE FF FF|=|D2 07 00 00|s|CF 0F B7 85|>|FE F
F FF 83 F8 0A|s|C3|f|C7 85|p|FF FF FF 02 00|f|C7 85|r|FF FF FF 00|P|E8|d|04
00 00 89 9D|t|FF FF FF|j|00|j|01|j|02 FF|U|B8 83 F8 FF|t|F2 89|E|80|j|01|Th~
f|04 80 FF|u|80 FF|U|A4|Yj|10 8D 85|p|FF FF FF|P|FF|u|80 FF|U|B0 BB 01 00 00
00 0B C0|tK3|DB FF|U|94|=3’|00 00|u?|C7 85|h|FF FF FF 0A 00 00 00 C7 85|l|FF
FF FF 00 00 00 00 C7 85|‘|FF FF FF 01 00 00 00 8B|E|80 89 85|d|FF FF FF 8D 8
5|h|FF FF FF|Pj|00 8D 85|‘|FF FF FF|Pj|00|j|01 FF|U|A0 93|j|00|Th~f|04 80 FF
|u|80 FF|U|A4|Y|83 FB 01|u1|E8 00 00 00 00|X-|D3 03 00 00|j|00|h|EA 0E 00 00
|P|FF|u|80 FF|U|AC|=|EA 0E 00 00|u|11|j|00|j|01 8D 85|\|FE FF FF|P|FF|u|80 F
F|U|A8 FF|u|80 FF|U|B4 E9 E7 FE FF FF BB 00 00 DF|w|81 C3 00 00 01 00 81 FB
00 00 00|xu|05 BB 00 00 F0 BF|‘|E8 0E 00 00 00 8B|d$|08|dg|8F 06 00 00|Xa|EB
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D9|dg|FF|6|00 00|dg|89|&|00 00|f|81|;MZu|E3 8B|K<|81|<|0B|PE|00 00|u|D7 8B|T
|0B|x|03 D3 8B|B|0C 81|<|03|KERNu|C5 81|||03 04|EL32u|BB|3|C9|I|8B|r |03 F3
FC|A|AD 81|<|03|GetPu|F5 81|||03 04|rocAu|EB 03|J|10|I|D1 E1 03|J$|0F B7 0C
0B C1 E1 02 03|J|1C 8B 04 0B 03 C3 89|D$$dg|8F 06 00 00|Xa|C3 E8|Q|FF FF FF
89|]|FC 89|E|F8 E8 0D 00 00 00|LoadLibraryA|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|F4 E8 0D
00 00 00|CreateThread|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|F0 E8 0D 00 00 00|GetTickCount
|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|EC E8 06 00 00 00|Sleep|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|E8
E8 17 00 00 00|GetSystemDefaultLangID|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|E4 E8 14 00 00
00|GetSystemDirectoryA|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|E0 E8 0A 00 00 00|CopyFileA|0
0 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|DC E8 10 00 00 00|GlobalFindAtomA|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8
89|E|D8 E8 0F 00 00 00|GlobalAddAtomA|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|D4 E8 0C 00 00
00|CloseHandle|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|D0 E8 08 00 00 00|_lcreat|00 FF|u|FC
FF|U|F8 89|E|CC E8 08 00 00 00|_lwrite|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|C8 E8 08 00 0
0 00|_lclose|00 FF|u|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|C4 E8 0E 00 00 00|GetSystemTime|00 FF|u
|FC FF|U|F8 89|E|C0 E8 0B 00 00 00|WS2_32.DLL|00 FF|U|F4 89|E|BC E8 07 00 00
00|socket|00 FF|u|BC FF|U|F8 89|E|B8 E8 0C 00 00 00|closesocket|00 FF|u|BC F
F|U|F8 89|E|B4 E8 0C 00 00 00|ioctlsocket|00 FF|u|BC FF|U|F8 89|E|A4 E8 08 0
0 00 00|connect|00 FF|u|BC FF|U|F8 89|E|B0 E8 07 00 00 00|select|00 FF|u|BC
FF|U|F8 89|E|A0 E8 05 00 00 00|send|00 FF|u|BC FF|U|F8 89|E|AC E8 05 00 00 0
0|recv|00 FF|u|BC FF|U|F8 89|E|A8 E8 0C 00 00 00|gethostname|00 FF|u|BC FF|U
|F8 89|E|9C E8 0E 00 00 00|gethostbyname|00 FF|u|BC FF|U|F8 89|E|98 E8 10 00
00 00|WSAGetLastError|00 FF|u|BC FF|U|F8 89|E|94 E8 0B 00 00 00|USER32.DLL|0
0 FF|U|F4 89|E|90 E8 0E 00 00 00|ExitWindowsEx|00 FF|u|90 FF|U|F8 89|E|8C C3
8B|E|84|i|C0 05 84 08 08|@|89|E|84 8D 84 04|xV4|12 F7 D8"; )
F.1.2 SQL Slammer
alert udp 129.241.208.0/24 1023 -> 129.241.196.0/24 1434 (msg: "Honeycomb Su
n May 14 13h17m15 2006 "; content: "|04 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0
1 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0
1 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 DC C9 B0|B|EB 0E 01 01 01 01 01 01 01|p|AE|B|01|p|AE|
B|90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90|h|DC C9 B0|B|B8 01 01 01 01|1|C9 B1 18|P|E2 FD|5|0
1 01 01 05|P|89 E5|Qh.dllhel32hkernQhounthickChGetTf|B9|llQh32.dhws2_f|B9|et
Qhsockf|B9|toQhsend|BE 18 10 AE|B|8D|E|D4|P|FF 16|P|8D|E|E0|P|8D|E|F0|P|FF 1
6|P|BE 10 10 AE|B|8B 1E 8B 03|=U|8B EC|Qt|05 BE 1C 10 AE|B|FF 16 FF D0|1|C9|
QQP|81 F1 03 01 04 9B 81 F1 01 01 01 01|Q|8D|E|CC|P|8B|E|C0|P|FF 16|j|11|j|0
2|j|02 FF D0|P|8D|E|C4|P|8B|E|C0|P|FF 16 89 C6 09 DB 81 F3|<a|D9 FF 8B|E|B4
8D 0C|@|8D 14 88 C1 E2 04 01 C2 C1 E2 08|)|C2 8D 04 90 01 D8 89|E|B4|j|10 8D
|E|B0|P1|C9|Qf|81 F1|x|01|Q|8D|E|03|P|8B|E|AC|P|FF D6 EB|"; )
F.2 Live Traffic Experiment
F.2.1 Cka
alert udp 157.100.79.1/32 137 -> 129.241.196.0/24 137 (msg: "Honeycomb Wed M
ay 31 16h41m58 2006 "; content: "|BA|5|00 10 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00| CKAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA|00 00|!|00 01 BA|d|00 10 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00|
CKAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA|00 00|!|00 01 BA A0 00 10 00 01 00 00 00 00
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00 00| CKAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA|00 00|!|00|"; )
F.2.2 Dos
alert tcp 24.253.57.97/32 any -> 158.38.144.0/24 3127 (msg: "Honeycomb Fri J
un 2 02h48m41 2006 "; flags: A+; flow: established; content: "|85 13|<|9E A
2|MZ|90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00|@|00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 D0 00 00 00 0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD|!|B8 01|L|CD|!
This program cannot be run in DOS mode.|0D 0D 0A|$|00 00 00 00 00 00 00 B5|.
$o|F1|OJ<|F1|OJ<|F1|OJ<|0B|k|0A|<|F3|OJ<|0B|lS<|F8|OJ<|F1|OK<|DE|OJ<|0B|kV<|
F0|OJ<|0B|kw<|F0|OJ<Rich|F1|OJ<|00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00|PE|00 00|L|01 03 00 12|J|16|@|00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 E0 00 0F 01 0B 01 0
7 00 00 90 00 00 00 10 00 00 00|P|00 00 00 E7 00 00 00|‘|00 00 00 F0 00 00 0
0 00|@|00 00 10 00 00 00 02 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 01 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 0
0 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
F0 00 00 04 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00|UPX0|00 00 00 00 00|P|00
00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8
0 00 00 E0|UPX1|00 00 00 00 00 90 00 00 00|‘|00 00 00 8A 00 00 00 04 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00|@|00 00 E0|UPX2|00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 0
0 F0 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 8E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00|@|00
00 C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00|1.24|00|UPX!|0C 09 02 09 F9 DE A8|n|B5|\|BA 83 98 C3 00 00 FA
86 00 00 00 A8 00 00|&|05 00|6|FF 1F 0A 92 00|BZh91AY&SY|A0 14|/|03 F2 FF DC
|j|00 C5|?|FF EF FF FE C3 14 FF C0 00 08|@|FF F2 FF BB|@~|C0 00|@|88 E0 8E B
E FB DB EB AC 00 0E 80 1B 0D 0A 01|m|A8 02 FF FF FF FF 94 AD 0F|p|EF|7|86 F7
BD|V^|EC F5 06 1E E8 E7|X|EF|W|A3 DE FB BE F3 BC BE D8 D1 9B 03|;|FF FF FF F
F BE E7 A7 B3 B7|>|DE E3|}|DE B7|^WJ\|D9|{k|E7 DE|<|A3 CB|}|E0 FB|,|FB EB DD
F7|v|FF FF FF FF BB|-|CC|}u|D5|U|F6 D1 99 F6 1C AE 0C|P|15|@|DF|=|1F|>N|FB 8
E B0 C9 AA 92 BE DB DE B1 BF FC FF FF E4 0A|ws7e|B5|7|8F|{.|CC C1 E9 CD 96 D
4|u|8D|5|ED 85 83|a|16 A8 0F FF FF FF FF|l:|D3|&|1E|{|EF 91|E|DE F4 C9|6mM|B
3|j|1B|f|9A EE C2 ED|||19 BB|l}|9A A1 09|t|DF FE FF FF D3|lm|DB|r}||DE E9 ED
C1 EB|=|E2 A2 B9 A6|Fn|F4 CF|o:|93 1C|v|D7|||FF FF FF ED 8C|y}|97 FA|w|B6 FB
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EA F1|wC+|DF|6|FA F5|j|ED F7|q|,}|DF|w|BD 0A FF FF FF FF DB|t|A9|9i|D0 EE CB
BD|3|95 E4 A3 9F|{|DA CF|,|B6 C3 AE|kG|AE|{|DE F2 DA BD EE EC|6|FF FF FF DB
EB|w|90 D5 EA D6 CE B7 B6 8F|(|A1|&|8D 90 F5 E9 C5 14 AF|n|B5|%Y|95 DB|uW|FF
BF FD FF B6|5|EE A4 CD C7 B0 AF|M|F0|iw|B2 8D BB CD DB|!|F2 EF|b|F3 EE|_[|B5
A3 D2 FF FF FF FF A8 F7|1|DB|g|D6|;/3v|9D B2|.M"; )
F.2.3 H04
alert tcp 66.0.0.0/8 any -> 129.241.196.0/24 80 (msg: "Honeycomb Tue May 30
06h29m45 2006 "; flags: A; flow: established; content: "SEARCH /|90 04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
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F.2 Live Traffic Experiment
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04
|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|04|H|0"; )
F.2.4 Lookfreebies
alert tcp 61.0.0.0/8 any -> 129.241.196.0/24 80 (msg: "Honeycomb Fri Jun 2
11h44m00 2006 "; flags: PA+; flow: established; content: "GET http://lookfr
eebies.com/prx1.php HTTP/1.0|0D 0A|Accept: */*|0D 0A|Accept-Language: en-us
|0D 0A|User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)|0D 0A
|Host: lookfreebies.com|0D 0A|Connection: Keep-Alive|0D 0A 0D|"; )
F.2.5 Msreg
alert udp any any -> 158.38.144.90/32 1026 (msg: "Honeycomb Tue May 30 11h48
m23 2006 "; content: "|04 00|(|00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 F8 91|{Z|00 FF D0 11 A9 B2 00 C0|O|B6 E6 FC DD 0C|K|D2 91|
z|FE B1|d|A2|/|E4 A3 BD|@|1C 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF
FF FF 18 01 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00|SYSTEM|00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00|ALERT|00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 D4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 D4 00 00 00|Microsoft Windows ha
s encounted an Internal Error|0A|Your windows registry is corrupted.|0A|Micr
osoft recommends a complete system scan.|0A 0A|Microsoft recommends|0A 0A|ht
tp://www.msreg.com|0A 0A|To repair now for a free download|0A 0A|"; )
F.2.6 Set32
alert udp 100.0.0.0/8 any -> 129.241.196.0/24 1026 (msg: "Honeycomb Thu Jun
1 01h59m15 2006 "; content: "|04 00|x|00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 F8 91|{Z|00 FF D0 11 A9 B2 00 C0|O|B6 E6 FC 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 FF FF FF FF 8B 01 00 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00|
SYSTEM|00 00 00 00 00 00|#|00 00 00 00 00 00 00|#|00 00 00|ALERT|00 00 00 0
0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
0 00 00|5|01 00 00 00 00 00 00|5|01 00 00|STOP! WINDOWS REQUIRES IMMEDIATE
ATTENTION.|0A 0A|Windows has found CRITICAL SYSTEM ERRORS.|0A 0A|To fix the
errors please do the following:|0A|1. Download Doctor Cleaner from: www.set
32.com|0A|2. Install Doctor Cleaner|0A|3. Run Doctor Cleaner|0A|4. Reboot y
our computer|0A|FAILURE TO ACT NOW MAY LEAD TO DATA LOSS AND CORRUPTION!|0A
0A 00 00 00 00 00|"; )
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HoneyComb Signatures
F.2.7 Tftp
alert tcp any any -> any 1926,8967 (msg: "Honeycomb Wed May 31 06h27m44 2006
"; flags: A+; flow: established; content: "tftp -i 192.168.116.2 GET h3110.4
11 package.exe & package.exe & exit|0A|"; )
F.2.8 Webdav
alert tcp 210.166.8.29/32 any -> 158.38.144.0/24 80 (msg: "Honeycomb Fri Jun
2 01h52m23 2006 "; flags: PA; flow: established; content: "OPTIONS / HTTP/1.
1|0D 0A|translate: f|0D 0A|User-Agent: Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/5.1.2600|0
D 0A|Host: 158.38.144.71|0D 0A|Content-Length: 0|0D 0A|Connection: Keep-Aliv
e|0D 0A|Pragma: no-cache|0D 0A 0D|"; )
130
Appendix G
Polymorphic packets
Packet 1
CA 64 09 00 12 05 04 AB 45 32 69 AC BF 89 99 21 44 85 23 55 71 53 10
Packet 2
CA 64 12 00 09 05 04 AB 45 32 69 AC BF 99 44 99 21 12 BA 22 41 00 01
Packet 3
05 04 AB 45 32 69 AC BF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
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Appendix H
Analysis Data
H.1 Number of Unique Signatures
Day NTNU Uninett
Day1 31826 2986
Day2 23440 2316
Day3 25914 3608
Day4 21392 3197
Day5 19243 2543
Day6 21724 2607
Day7 17909 2564
Table H.1: Number of unique signatures.
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Analysis Data
H.2 Unique Signatures Categorized by Type
Signature categories Unique signatures
Worm activity 18273
Worm related activity 193
Misc attack 6095
Web server attacks 6740
Messenger spam 147193
SSH attacks 360
Reconnaissance activity 2278
FTP attacks 137
Table H.2: Unique signatures categorized by type.
H.3 Inbound Alerts and Packets
Day Inbound alerts Inbound packets
Day1 2416 23237
Day2 2406 15955
Day3 2298 18033
Day4 2604 22305
Day5 2299 14068
Day6 2548 17987
Day7 3187 18500
Table H.3: Number of inbound alerts and packets.
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